We list below papers presented at the 2017 conferences of the European Union Studies Association, Miami; the Glasgow conference of the US-based Centre for European Studies; and UACES (the UK based University Association of Centres of University Studies), Krakow. We will add appropriate papers from the 2017 ECPR conference in Oslo and the APSA conference in San Francisco.

The abstracts are ordered alphabetically by the first-named author. Each abstract has key words to facilitate searching. Email addresses are given so the author(s) can be requested to provide the full text of their presentation.

TitleAuthorsAbstractkey wordsPresented in
Digital Architectures and Deliberative Potentials: Citizen Debate on Facebook and Twitter During the Brexit CampaignAnamaria DUTCEAC SEGESTEN,
Lund University, anamaria.
dutceac_segesten
@eu.lu.se, Michael BOSSETTA, University of Copenhagen
Because of social media, traditional models of campaigning are undergoing a transformation: information is abundant, misinformation goes unchecked, and citizens’ voices are more salient in the public sphere. However, social media platforms have different ‘digital architectures’ - the technological structures that facilitate and constrain user behavior. While much academic focus has been given to studying political campaigning on social media, few studies focus on citizens and even fewer take into account how the digital architectures of a medium impact the quality of deliberative debate online. Using the 2016 Brexit campaign as a case study, the proposed paper compares how the Leave and Remain positions were discussed on Facebook and Twitter. We argue that these platforms’ potential for acting as deliberative arenas varies depending on their digital architectures (i.e. their feed algorithms, the ‘Friend’ or ‘Follower’ relationship, and the degree of visibility of their posts). We test this argument by comparing, over the entire duration of the campaign, citizens’ comments made to the public Facebook pages of the Leave and Remain campaigns, as well as citizens’ Twitter messages using the corresponding hashtags on Twitter. Using supervised machine learning methods in R, we identify discursive frames indicating homophily among users (e.g. agreement) or heterogeneity (e.g. disagreement). We expect to find that Facebook is more likely to host discussions among like-minded users (homophily), whereas Twitter debates are more likely to be more confrontational, taking place between users holding opposing views (heterogeneity). The results are discussed in light of social media’s democratic potential.Brexit, media, social media, Facebook, Twitter, democracyCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Direct Democracy, the Structure of Government and Welfare State Expansion 1930-2000André WALTER, University of St. Gallen, andre.walter@unisg.chThe existing literature on welfare state development holds a pessimistic view on the role of direct democracy for welfare state generosity. More specifically, the literature argues that referendums constrain the extension of social security spending while pro-welfare initiatives are mostly rejected. In contrast, I argue that the effect of initiatives on welfare state extension is conditional on the political environment. More precisely, I combine insights from the the political economy literature about the structure of the government with comparative welfare state research. Using panel data on social expenditure in the Swiss cantons from 1930 to 2000, I show that initiatives constrain social spending of multiparty governments but expand social spending of single party governments. In addition, I provide case evidence from the Swiss cantons to explore the causal links between initiatives and social expenditure.referendums, welfare state, Switzerland, public spendingCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Incongruence Between European, National and Regional Elections in the European Multilevel Electoral SystemArjan SCHAKEL, Maastricht University, a.schakel
@maastrichtuniversity.nl
The number of countries holding elections for the European Parliament has increased from 9 in 1979 to 28 in 2014. Since the 1970s, 19 European Union member states hold or have introduced elections to a regional tier of government. The electoral transformation has been accompanied by shifts in authority. The stakes in supranational and subnational elections have increased because substantial authority has shifted from the national level to the regional and European levels. Opportunities have increased for voters to express their opinion about policies and governments across electoral arenas. But in how far represent supranational and subnational election outcomes a deviation from electoral behaviour in the national political arena? In this paper I will explore dissimilarity in the vote between European, national and regional elections. By employing various incongruence measures I explore where, when and how the European vote differs from the national and regional vote in the European regions. Dissimilarity in the vote is related to various factors which are thought to impact on congruence between electoral outcomes. Special attention will be given to electoral timing of an election vis-à-vis other elections, authority endowed to regional tiers of government, and territorial cleavages. I assess the impact of these variables by exploiting a unique dataset which contains European, national and regional election results disaggregated at the regional level for 180 regions in eight EU member states from 1979 until 2014.elections, European Parliament, tiers of governmentCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Brexit and the Problem of European DisintegrationBen ROSAMOND, University of Copenhagen, bf@ifs.ku.dkThis paper uses Brexit as a platform for thinking through some key issues associated with what might be called ‘European disintegration’. The result of the referendum in the UK held on 23 June 2016 certainly poses many more questions than it answers, but at the very least it raises the very real prospect of a member state leaving the European Union. What that might mean for both the UK and the EU has very quickly become one of the defining questions of contemporary European politics. At the same time, scholars working on the EU are arguably very poorly prepared to grasp analytically the mechanics of disintegration that Brexit has unleashed (or of which it is a symptom). This paper revisits some key currents in EU Studies to show that the absence of a worked through concept of disintegration is not necessarily a failing of extant theory as a few scholars have suggested, but rather reflective of a general tendency to divorce the analysis of the EU from broader discussions about the dynamics of capaitalist democracy in Europe. Bringing political economy 'back in' in this way allows us to develop a more systematic understanding the meaning of distintegration, the dynamics of distintegration and the associations between distintegrative tendencies and the unravelling of teh European democratic capitalist compact.Brexit, referendums, European integrationCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Anarchism After Brexit (and Before IndyRef 2): On Anarchist Engagements with Benjamin FRANKS, University of Glasgow, Benjamin.Franks
@glasgow.ac.uk
Anarchism has frequently been distinguished from other members of socialist tradition through its hostility to constitutional activity. Criticisms of state-centred decision-making have been a core feature of anarchism from Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin and Emma Goldman to the present day. Anarchist critiques concentrate not only on the deficiencies of representative politics: generation of hierarchies, corruption of benevolent, productive social practices but also the benefits of anarchism’s diverse, fluid and accessible forms of political decision-making across diverse terrains for local and trans-national social organisation. The critique of electoralism is a highlighted in anarchist abstentionist and anti-election campaigns (for instance from the Anti-Elections Alliance and Angry not Apathetic). However, there have been minority traditions within anarchism that has engaged in democratic activism. This paper examines the three main positions on anarchist engagements in representative democracy: 1. Horizontal, Structural Reformism; 2. Revolutionary (Anti-) Representation and 3. Guerrilla Activism. In particular it examines these models of anti-state constitutional engagement as to how they apply to direct rather than representative elections. The paper uses the debates around the Scottish Independence referendum (2014) and the referendum on membership of the European Union (2016) as key examples, but also draws on anarchist engagements in referendum campaigns in other EU and continental European countries such as the Irish Republic and Switzerland. It concentrates on answering the questions as: whether forms of anti-state electoral engagement can successfully avoid the criticisms anarchists make of state-centred democracy? And what are the impacts of electoral participation on formally diverse, anti-hierarchical social organisation?Brexit, political decision-making, activism, Ireland, Switzerland, UK, anarchismCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, 12-14 July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Culture and Dis-Integration: Religion and the Brexit VoteBrent F. NELSEN, Furman University, brent.nelsen@furman.edu, James L. GUTH, Furman UniversityScholars have known for some time that religion, more precisely “confessional culture,” exerts a deep and independent effect on attitudes toward the European Union and the formation of a European identity. In this paper we use several recent surveys of British respondents to demonstrate the impact of religion on the June 2016 vote to leave the EU. One of the data sets used in the study features an unusually detailed religious identity question that allows us to analyze the impact of Protestant denomination on the Brexit vote. The findings of the paper are consistent with the results of past studies. Protestants remain less enthusiastic about European integration than other religious traditions, with sectarian Protestants most resistant to the EU. Religious divisions, however, remains complicated and must be interpreted carefully. The primary implication for the future of European integration, however, is clear: the EU member states most likely to withdraw from the EU or strongly resist further integrative efforts will be member states shaped by Protestant confessional culture.Brexit, religion, Protestantism, EU integrationCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Brexit and EU Citizenship: The Construction of European Solidarity in Germany Following the UK ReferendumCharlotte GALPIN, University of Copenhagen, c.galpin@hum.ku.dkThe ‘Leave’ vote in the UK referendum on EU membership shocked the continent. Already beset by a number of crises, EU leaders quickly moved into crisis management mode. The first priority for the EU was to maintain unity amongst the remaining member states. Discussion immediately turned to ‘solidarity between the EU27’ and the need to ensure the UK left the EU as quickly as possible. Through political claims-making analysis of public sphere debates, using Germany as a case study on account of the important role it will play in Brexit negotiations, this paper will analyse elite actor claims about European solidarity in the months following the referendum. While intended to assuage uncertainty and prevent contagion, these moves raise fundamental questions about European solidarity and EU citizenship at this unprecedented time. In legal terms, EU citizenship is derived from national citizenship. The EU has, however, stated that EU citizenship is a tool for the development of European identity. In practice, many British EU citizens have taken advantage of these rights and become reliant on freedom of movement and the principle of non-discrimination. Until the UK formally leaves, it remains a full member of the EU. This paper therefore examines the public opinions about Brexit made by EU actors in Germany and, by analysing actor frames, identify models of European solidarity constructed in the Brexit debate. Are there public expressions of solidarity with British EU citizens as Europeans? Alternatively, are conceptions of European solidarity limited to the EU27?Brexit, Germany, citizenship, European identity, freedom of movement, referendum, attitudes towards EUCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
The Conspicuous Absence of Local Government during the EU Referendum CampaignChristopher HUGGINS, Keele University, c.i.huggins@keele.ac.uk The voice of local government during the EU referendum campaign was largely absent. This is surprising given the impact of the EU on English local government. Local authorities are responsible for the implementation of 70% of EU policy. They are main beneficiary of the EU's Structural and Investment Funds. EU rules, such as on procurement and state aid, affect the delivery of local services. Local authorities are also heavily engaged at the European level, both formally through recognition in the Committee of the Regions, and informally through Brussels offices to lobby EU institutions and in transnational networking with other localities to access EU funding, influence EU policy and share policy innovation with European partners. Local government was therefore heavily invested in the outcome of the referendum, yet the local dimension to the UK's relationship with the EU was overlooked while the campaign was dominated by discussions on national sovereignty, immigration, economic prosperity and international trade. Drawing on centralization, local leadership and local level Europeanization literatures, this paper explores why one of the most Europeanized parts of the British polity struggled to find a voice and was largely absent from the EU referendum campaign.local government, referendums, BrexitUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Motivated Reasoning and Voter Behaviour in EU ReferendumsDerek BEACH, University of Aarhus, derek@ps.au.dk, Daniel FINKE, University of AarhusIn this paper, we argue that EU-skeptic voters are more likely to engage in motivated reasoning then EU-friendly voters because of stronger held underlying attitudes towards the EU. Based on evidence from studies of EU-skepticism and public opinion towards the EU, we should expect that anti-EU attitudes are affect-based, meaning that voters would hold them more strongly (Boomgarden et al. 2011). We assess the effects of stronger held attitudes on voting behavior, assessing: 1) whether motivated reasoning reinforces the relevance of issue voting and reduces the relevance of party endorsements for EU-skeptic respondents (H1), whether EU-skeptic voters are more certain about what they should vote and they make up their minds earlier because of motivated reasoning (H2), whether EU-skeptic respondents are more prone to follow frames that confirm their ideological position (H3), and whether EU-skeptic voters feel more informed because of their selective recruitment of evidence (H4). While most of the political psychology literature that has assessed motivated reasoning effects have utilized experimental data, we explore whether we find evidence of these effects in a real-world environment using survey data collected by the authors in the 2015 JHA referendum in Denmark. We find evidence that suggests that EU-skeptical voters were more susceptible to arguments that matched their underlying issue attitudes, were more certain of their vote, and overall engaged in more issue-voting. The implication of our findings is that more information provided by a referendum campaign will not necessarily convince skeptics. Indeed, it might paradoxically make them more certain that they will vote no.referendums, Brexit, Denmark, Euroscepticism, attitudes towards EUEuropean Union Studies Association, 15th Biennial Conference, May 2017, Miami, FL, USA
Attitudes Towards European Integration at Times of Crisis: The Case of GreeceDimitris TSAROUHAS, Bilkent University, dimitris@bilkent.edu.tr, Georgios KARYOTIS, University of GlasgowThe pace and legitimacy of the European Integration project has, to some extent, always been held at the hands of the public, with over 45 referendums held in the past five decades in Member States. However, the Eurozone crisis and the recent ‘Brexit’ vote in the United Kingdom have provided new impetus for exploring how attitudes towards the EU develop. Using Greece as a case study, this paper analyses the drivers of attitudes towards European integration, focussing on how crisis dynamics affect support for further unification. The paper draws on original and pertinent survey evidence collected between 2010 and 2015 through representative telephone surveys. The analysis synthesises insights from political behaviour, crisis management and the Europeanisation theory to test a range of relevant hypotheses. Findings demonstrate that public evaluations on the causes, severity, responsibility, and responses to the Greek debt crisis are key factors of support for the EU project, alongside trust and other political values associated with authoritarianism, multiculturalism and globalisation. The discussion explores these results and their theoretical and comparative implications.Greece, Europeanisation, referendums, debt crisis, attitudes towards EU, EU integrationCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
EU Referendums: What Can we Learn from the Swiss CaseEva HEIDBREDER, Free University Berlin, Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg, eva.heidbreder@ovgu.de, Isabelle STADELMANN-STEFFEN, University of Bern, Eva THOMANN, University of Heidelberg, Fritz SAGER, University of BernThe recent Brexit vote has reinforced scholarly interest in the role of referendums on European Union (EU) matters. This research note argues that when analysing these referendums, more systematic reference should be made to existing research on direct democracy, especially from the Swiss and US context. Therefore, this research note scrutinises the research questions raised, explanatory and methodological models commonly applied in research on EU-referendums, in order to pinpoint insights that have been missed. Offering a comparative perspective on theoretical approaches, empirical findings and methodological innovations in referendum research allows identifying more accurately scope conditions under which referendums operate in the EU. Particularly, the dynamics of referendums depend strongly on the wider democratic institutional framework. Methodological challenges for predicting polling outcomes, and the interplay between direct democracy and populist appeals also need more explicit consideration in EU referendum research.referendums, Switzerland, Brexit, European integrationEuropean Union Studies Association, 15th Biennial Conference, May 2017, Miami, FL, USA
EU Referenda: What to Learn from the Swiss CaseEva THOMANN, Heidelberg University, eva.thomann@ipw.uni-heidelberg.de, Eva HEIDBREDER, University of Dusseldorf, Isabelle STADELMANN-STEFFEN, University of Bern, Fritz SAGER, University of BernThe recent Brexit vote has reinforced scholarly interest in the role of European Union (EU) referenda for European integration. This research note argues that Swiss experience with EU-related direct democratic votes represents a critical case for the study of EU referenda in the present era. The rich body of related research provides a useful starting point for exploring some of the most pressing questions in research on EU referenda. Therefore, this research note discusses three ways in which insights from Switzerland can contribute to this research. First, it helps us understand the circumstances under which popular votes effectively serve political and / or legitimizing purposes. Second, we derive insights on the role of campaigning, the multidimensionality and lacking predictability of the outcomes of popular votes, and propose methodological improvements. Third, we discuss the implications of popular votes for the legitimacy of EU integration as well as their mindful implementation.referendums, Switzerland, Brexit, European integrationCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Referendums in the European Union: Defective by Birth?Francis CHENEVAL,
University of Zürich, francis.cheneval@philos.uzh.ch, Mónica FERRÍN,
University of Zürich and Collegio Carlo Alberto
On the basis of a combined examination of normative claims and empirical evidence this paper discusses minimal criteria for the institutional design of referendums on EU-internal issues. These criteria concern the mandatory (vs. facultative), the simultaneous (vs. serial) and binding (vs. consultative) nature of referenda. The proposed criteria are demanding, both for the member states and the European Union, but experiences show that the EU is in fact participating actively in EU-issues referendums and member states as well as the EU need to surpass the current arbitrary use of plebiscites by governments. On a broader scale the paper contributes to the insight that it might be time to fully address the use of direct democracy at the national and EU levels. referendums, attitudes towards EUEuropean Union Studies Association, 15th Biennial Conference, May 2017, Miami, FL, USA
‘Let’s Take Back Control’ and Other Effective Bullshit: Immigration in the European Union Referendum CampaignJames HAMPSHIRE, University of Sussex, J.A.Hampshire@sussex.ac.ukImmigration was central to the EU referendum campaign, and played an important if not decisive role in the outcome. This paper examines public statements on immigration during the campaign through the lens of political bullshit. As defined by Harry Frankfurt, bullshit is a mode of discourse unrelated to truth-values, and it is prevalent in politics. While the liar pays indirect homage to truth by consciously telling untruths, the bullshitter speaks without regard for truth-values. Hopkin and Rosamond argue that political bullshit is often effective because it is difficult to refute empirically. This paper traces the EU referendum campaign from its focus on the Remainers’ preferred territory of the economic effects of Brexit – in which empirical claim and counter-claim predominated – through to a debate centred on the Leave campaign’s key message of ‘taking back control’, which became increasingly focused on immigration control. The paper investigates how the debate shifted not only in terms of issues but also qualitatively: away from empirical claims and predictions, towards an explicitly anti-expert and post-truth form of politics in which the Leave campaign successfully articulated a Brexit narrative in empowering and emotionally reassuring language, largely impervious to factual refutation; in other words, as bullshit. This proved to be an effective strategy for the Leave campaign, while Remain were unable to mount a compelling counter-argument. The argument draws on analysis of a corpus of public statements from the campaign, including speeches and interviews by leading politicians, televised debates, campaign posters and leaflets, and press releases.Brexit, discourse analysis, immigration, political bullshitCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Europeanisation of Media Discourse? Brexit Discourses in the Polish PressKatarzyna ANDREJUK, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, kandrejuk@ifispan.waw.pl The results of the United Kingdom EU membership referendum in June 2016 have met with great media resonance abroad. The aim of the presentation is to analyse the discourse about Britain's exit from the European Union in the Polish press. Scrutinised will be the diversification of topics and social/political meanings associated with Brexit. The Brexit was mostly analysed from the perspective of Poland's state interests and potential losses and gains on the national (Polish and UK) levels. The most visible topics included the anticipated changes in migration patterns to/from the UK, challenges to freedom of movement of goods and services, meaning of Brexit in the context of political shift to the right wing parties and populist movements. The analysis will encompass the discourses presented in the press titles associated with various sides of the left-right political spectrum. The question will be asked whether the dominant press discourse demonstrated a pro-European approach to the political turmoil, or it was more mixed depending on the political views represented by certain media.media, Brexit, Poland, EuropeanisationUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Politicizing Perceptions: UK Citizens' Perceptions of Income and Support for UK and European Union GovernanceKathryn SIMPSON, Manchester Metropolitan University, k.simpson@mmu.ac.ukStunningly in the UK, there has been a vote to leave the European Union (23 June 2016). This marks a culmination of challenges to the UK government and its position on both the market and the EU. The rise of both the BNP and UKIP as anti-EU parties (not to exclude some of the Conservatives' own membership); the recently troubled leadership of self-identified democratic socialist, Jeremy Corbyn, as Leader of the Labour Party; and the Brexit vote have given rise to deep concerns that UK politics has veered from decades-old ' left-right politics.' The challenges appear to come from a number of sources but underpinning them are citizens' perceptions of the UK and its economic and political performance - traditional cornerstones of effective, representational, and legitimate government. Therefore, this paper investigates the politicization of UK citizens' perceptions of national inequality and the effect this has on individuals' support for both the UK and EU governments using the British Election Study (BES). I argue that individuals' perceptions of national economic performance can be partially understood as a function of politicization. That is, in addition to individual attributes, individuals' perceptions of national economic performance are potentially shaped by parties, politicians, and the mass media which provide citizens with both relevant information - as well as ideological frames. It follows that the capacity of media or elite/party to bias individuals' perceptions of national performance would significantly reshape how we think about the role of these political intermediaries in shaping public perceptions of national performance as well as determining EU support.Brexit, attitudes towards EU, political parties, British Election Study, votingUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Making Sense of Brexit: The Implications for Domestic Social PolicyKathryn SIMPSON, Manchester Metropolitan University, k.simpson@mmu.ac.ukFor the first time in the history of the European Union (EU) a member state has voted to leave the Union. The UK has often been coined 'an awkward partner' a catch-all term to encompass the UK's troubled relationship with the European integration process and the recent vote to leave the EU reiterates the UK's ambivalence towards its place in the wider European family. While a full analysis of electoral data from the EU referendum on 23rd June ensues, what is immediately evident is that the UK electorate is inherently fragmented and that leave voters in particular voted for a range of issues that went beyond EU issues per se. Throughout the referendum debate these issues encompassed a range of domestic social policies such as immigration, the economy and health. However, in light of Brexit there are many social policy areas which will be directly impacted yet did not feature predominantly in the referendum debate. This article examines the impact of Brexit across three key domestic policy areas; immigration and free movement, the devolved legislatures and the economy using data from the British Election Study (BES) post-EU referendum survey.Brexit, EU integration, social policy, British Election StudyUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
The Brexit Paradox: How Leaving the EU Just May Mobilize Pro-European Support in BritainKristine MITCHELL, Dickinson College, mitchellk@dickinson.eduItaly has Alcide De Gasperi and Altiero Spinelli; France, Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors; Belgium Paul-Henri Spaak and Guy Verhofstadt. But prominent, ardent pro-Europeanists, willing to make the pro-integration—even the federal—case for Europe have been hard to find in British national debate. Ironically, the shock referendum result has inspired Britain’s “closet Europeanists” to declare themselves. In petitions, marches, and other demonstrations, significant numbers of British citizens have joined forces to resist “Brexit”. The paradox of Brexit just may be that, by emboldening a long-subdued pro-European constituency, preparing Britain to leave the EU may just give rise to its first prominent Euro-federalists: figures prepared to argue persuasively and passionately for a British future in an integrating Europe. Could a “British Delors” or an “English Spinelli” yet convince Britons that their future lies with the EU?Brexit, Euroscepticism, European integration, attitudes towards EUCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Think Nationally, Vote Locally: National Issues and Voting Behaviour in Local, Regional and European Elections in SpainLaura CABEZA PÉREZ, SOCLIFE - University of Cologne, cabeza@wiso.uni-koeln.deThe second-order election model is among the most influential conceptual frameworks for analyzing sub-national and supra-national election results. Yet, most studies focus on its aggregate predictions. According to this model, election results at any level are a by-product of the national government popularity because, instead of holding accountable sub-national or supra-national representatives, citizens presumably decide whether to vote and for whom on the grounds of the first-order national arena. Using data from election surveys in Spain, this article develops and tests a micro-level approach to the study of second-order effects in sub-national and supra-national elections. It is argued that in every election at local, regional or European level there are individuals that decide their vote – or whether to vote or not – on the basis of national considerations and individuals that make their decisions based on level-specific issues. Each election will show a different distribution of citizens that vote on the basis of national versus level-specific issues. Using a new dataset that combines data from a set of election surveys in Spain, this article analyzes (1) which individual characteristics encourage citizens to ‘think nationally’ in local, regional and European elections, and (2) whether the core assumptions of the second-order election model hold at the individual level leading to differences in terms of voting behaviour between those citizens that ‘think nationally’ and those who do not. Doing so, this research contributes to recent efforts that have already recognized the need to identify the individual mechanisms behind the second-order election model.elections, voting behaviourCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Examination of Discourses in the Referendums, and How They Built up, or Questioned, Romanticised NationalismsLeigh FRENCH, Glasgow School of Art, L.French1@student.gsa.ac.ukDuring the referendum, from an anti-capitalist standpoint, Gordon Asher and Leigh French denounced the consensus whereby independence and participation in the campaign were ‘posited as ipso facto “progressive”’ in ways that elided struggles for social justice and empowerment. I am interested in examining the ways in which both pro-independence discourses produced in the run-up to the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and discourses in favour of Brexit before and after the 2016 referendum share common ground in furthering such elision on two points. On the one hand, through the pursuit of nation-states as independent / insulated from supra-national institutions of governance as the emancipatory way out of austerity they both put the national(ist) aspect of capitalism beyond contestation. On the other hand, both sets of narratives empty out class a category of struggle at multiple scales while elevating institutions are the terrain and agents of conflict, and thus as the recipient of citizens’ loyalty. Consideration of the ways in which autonomous movements and collectives have been operating in Scotland within (post-)referendum contexts – in terms of the limits, tensions, and possibilities involved – affords a way of putting pressure, from an anti-capitalist autonomist perspective, on the logics and politics that clash with those informing pro-independence and Brexit discourses. referendums, nationalism, attitudes towards EU, Scotland, Scottish independenceCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
A Qualitative Inquiry into How Europe is Narrated in the Context of the ‘Brexit’Loredana RADU, College of Communication and Public Relations, loredana.radu@comunicare.ro, Flavia DURACH, College of Communication and Public RelationsIn a context marked by numerous overlapping European crises, europeanization processes might be subject to an extreme pressure exerted by national proxies, which might denounce EU's lack of vision. Subscribing to a constructivistic approach of European integration, where discourse is a means by which europeanization is designed and built, we focus on the key narratives and frames exposed by the online media when discussing about the "Brexit". The aim of our paper is to explore the complex interactions between frames and narratives, which fortify the architectural structure of the mediatized discourse on the European Union. Our researchs builds on H.-J. Trenz's narratives of Europeanization - as variants of affirmation or disruption, and the extraordinary and the ordinary, respectively (2014), but, also, on research dedicated to news framing as a means to convey a certain type of meaning to the mediatized discourse. By turning to Romanian and "Pan-European" online media outlets, we explore the two-way relationship by hypothesizing that frames and narratives of Europeanization overlap in an orderly manner, creating meaningful patterns and associations. We expect to find proof of the sudden transition from positive accounts of Europeanization to the activation of disruptive discourses (de-sacralization and crisis), with a long term negative impact over the European project at such.Brexit, Europeanisation, mediaUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Reconciling ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’: Northern Ireland and the EU ReferendumMary MURPHY, University College Cork, maryc.murphy@ucc.ieThe UK referendum decision to leave the European Union (EU) in June 2016 exposes a marked political, ideological, socio-economic, demographic and geographic divisions across the UK., Scotland, Northern Ireland and London voted to Remain. Interestingly however, the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland did not vote homogenously (as has traditionally been the case) in this referendum. Although nationalists were more likely to vote Remain, approximately one third of unionists also did. Given Northern Ireland’s history of conflict, this vote demonstrates some unity of preference across the political divide. The legitimacy of Northern Ireland’s vote however, is challenged by the fact that it conflicts with the overall UK wide vote. This begs questions about how to accommodate legitimate regional democratic preferences with the broader contrasting national context, and also during negotiations between the UK and the EU. For all the recent political progress in Northern Ireland, the region still remains politically vulnerable. That vulnerability may be challenged if the EU referendum result is not handled sensitively and creatively. This paper examines how political leaders and policy actors in various settings (i.e. Northern Ireland, UK, Republic of Ireland and the EU) might achieve accountability to the Northern Ireland majority while respecting the national legitimacy of the overall vote. The use of creative and constructive ambiguity, and agreement on ‘special’ arrangements for Northern Ireland vis-à-vis the Republic of Ireland post-Brexit may be the most effective means of securing stability and responding to the Northern Ireland majority.Brexit, Northern IrelandCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Northern Ireland and Brexit: An Opportunity to Consolidate the Peace Process?Mary MURPHY, University College Cork, maryc.murphy@ucc.ieIn contrast to other parts of the UK, Northern Ireland voted in June 2016 to remain in the EU. This result conflicts with the overall UK vote to leave the EU. The discrepancy has led to calls (mainly by nationalists) for Northern Ireland's democratic preference to be respected. There is some justification for such appeals. Being the only territory of the EU (bar Gibraltar) which shares a land border with the EU, Northern Ireland will likely face the worst consequences of Brexit, whatever form it takes. The economic and political ramifications are likely to be negative and possibly severe. The Prime Minister has - unsurprisingly - ruled out any asymmetrical approach to the UK exit process, but she has committed to giving consideration to the specific needs and interests of particular parts of the UK. Northern Ireland, however, is not a priority for a UK government. There is therefore, a need for the devolved Northern Ireland authorities to press the region's case at multiple levels both within the UK and beyond. This is a strategically important means of getting the best deal for Northern Ireland during the exit process. Pursuing such a strategy, however, is not straightforward for a post-conflict society and a power-sharing political system. Nationalists were far more likely to vote remain while approximately one third of unionists also supported this position. More significantly, however, the two parties to the Northern Ireland Executive expressed contrasting positions on the EU referendum.. Designing a Northern Ireland strategy which satisfies both parties' political sensitivities demands political maturity. It requires the Northern Ireland authorities to confront challenging issues related to sovereignty and the UK's constitutional future. This political challenge represents a serious test for Northern Ireland's power-sharing arrangement. The ability of the Northern Ireland Executive to meet this challenge represents a potentially defining moment in the maturation of Northern Ireland politics and society. Creative and constructive ambiguity played a role in facilitating agreement on the 1998 Belfast Agreement. It is needed now more than ever.Brexit, Northern Ireland, referendumsUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Brexit and the Role of the Press and Online Media in Re-Narrating Europe’s Discourse Before and After the ReferendumMarzia MACCAFERRI, Goldsmiths College, University of London, email missingPresent-day debate seems less intellectually-driven and academic in his language, and more in touch with the public opinion with evidence of the penetration of populist attitude into the traditional political space.
Starting from here, this paper will question the role of traditional and online media in narrating and re-narrating the Brexit discourse and the European question, both before and after the referendum. Sources will be traditional British quality press, newspaper and magazines, and online media.
Drawing from Historical Discourse Analysis and Critical studies and built upon a historical approach, this paper will examine how the current re-narration of the European question is reproducing and reinterpreting historical arguments vis-à-vis old clichés. Does Brexit debate shape a new form of British Euroscepticism based on a new sense of economic confidence? Does the new discursive construction of Europe consist in a confrontation between this new sense of confidence in the nation’s potentialities, and the pursue of a new international role for Britain as a champion of freedom and as an example of democracy? How important is the discourse of historical categories as British ‘splendid isolation’ or ‘special relationship’, and ‘British cultural peculiarity’ or ‘political traditions? Does the discursive construction of Brexit parallel the widely held view of populism as a consequence of economic insecurity? Or, alternatively, can Brexit populist discourse be explained as a retro reaction by a once-predominant traditional political culture to progressive value changes? Does Brexit represent a new ‘cultural cleavage’ dividing Populists from Cosmopolitans?
Brexit, referendums, media, Euroscepticism, European integration, discourse analysis, attitudes towards EUCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
A 'Tipping Point' Already Reached? Tabloid Portrayals and Other Influences on the Brexit VoteNicholas STARTIN, University of Bath, n.j.startin@bath.ac.ukThe result of the June 2016 UK referendum on EU membership sent shockwaves through the UK, European and global political establishments. This paper argues that the outcome of the plebiscite should not be viewed through this lens given the historical context of the UK's at best ambivalent or at worst hostile relationship with the EU.The paper illustrates this by analysing a number of significant historic and contemporary demand-side and institutional variables that played into Vote Leave's favour prior to the campaign. It then discusses the supply-side variables that influenced the result of the campaign. The paper focuses on the role of the media and in particular the UK's uniquely hostile Eurosceptic press as a major influence on the outcome.By drawing on a content analysis of the front pages of the UK's main tabloid newspapers, it demonstrates, firstly, the severity of the lopsided pro-Brexit discourse evident prior to and during the campaign before linking the discussion to the extent to which this 'bombardment' approach influenced the electorate. It concludes that, given the high level of 'knowledge deficit' on the European question in the UK, the tabloid's bombardment approach had a significant bearing on tipping the vote towards Brexit.Brexit, attitudes towards EU, attitudes towards UK, Euroscepticism, mediaUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
West Meets East: The Case of the Big-Bang Enlargement and the Rise in UK Euroscepticism 2004-2016Przemyslaw BISKUP, University of Warsaw, p.b.biskup@uw.edu.plThe Big-Bang Enlargement of 2004-2007 has proven to be a major source of tensions in national and EU-level politics. This paper will attempt to examine the mode of development and identify specific sources of transformation of the enlargement fatigue into a highly popular Eurosceptical stance in the United Kingdom as one of the key EU members and original advocates of the widely-open borders. Importantly, Euroscepticism in the UK is a complex phenomenon to be explained both in party-politics and national-identity terms. The paper will argue that while it is a principled and well-argued stance that has been legitimising British Euroscepticsm since 1960s, it was the Big-Bang Enlargement fatigue that finally made it politically viable. The issue has become central since the 201) and 2015 General Election campaigns, which have been decisive for the future of the UKIP as a respectable party and the fate of UK's EU referendum. The issue also played a central role in the 2016 EU referendum, and its final result in support of Brexit. The paper shall focus on the comparative manifesto and party-platform analysis of the leading UK parties: the Tories, Labour, UKIP and LibDems, to be focused on issues connected to Euroscepticsm and immigration from the "new" EU countries in years 2001-2016. It will incorporate the data collected during the Warsaw University-based research project conducted in 2011-2014.Euroscepticism, Brexit, elections, national identityUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
National Referendums Challenge the Sustainability of the EURichard ROSE, University of Strathclyde Glasgow, richard.rose@strath.ac.ukThe European Union has relied for its legitimacy on institutions of representative democracy, in which a Council of nationally elected governments and nationally elected members of the European Parliament take decisions binding on EU citizens. However, at the national level there is a rise in votes for parties protesting against their government’s acceptance of EU policies. There is also a rising demand for national referendums to mandate their national government to reject, in advance or nullify after the fact acceptance of EU policies on such issues as immigration. Since 2014 there have been national referendums in Greece, the Netherlands, the UK, Hungary and Switzerland. Each claims to invoke the accountability of national governments to national electorates as superior to the additiional accountability of their government to multi-national EU institutions authorized by EU treaties. The 2016 UK referendum resolved this conflict by a majority voting to leave the EU. Much more widespread is the threat to EU authority posed by European Council members mandated by national referendums to reject EU policies. The paper will contrast older theories of how EU institutions represent their citizens with the new challenge to the sustainability of the EU due to the spread of the demand for and use of national referendums. It will draw on discussion in a Workshop with academics and policymakers that I am organising in January, 2017 at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute.referendums, Brexit, attitudes towards EU, EU integration, Greece, Netherlands, Hungary, SwitzerlandCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Consequences of National Referendums for the EU's LegitimacyRichard ROSE, University of Strathclyde Glasgow, richard.rose@strath.ac.ukThe European Union has relied for its legitimacy on the absolute value of European unity and the instrumental value of dealing effectively with interdependent problems of national security, politics and economics that no country can solve on its own. The EU's policies for the economy and immigration have produced a rise in votes for parties protesting against their government's acceptance of EU policies. There is also a rising demand for national referendums to mandate their national government to reject, in advance or to nullify after the fact, acceptance of EU policies on such issues as immigration. Since 2014 there have been national referendums in Greece, the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK, Hungary and Switzerland. Each reverses the EU definition of the competence of national governments as subsidiarity to the claims of the EU and asserts the superior authority of a national government when its citizens disagree with what is done in their name as European citizens subject to EU authority. National referendums enable people with dual citizenships to use their national citizenship to challenge EU policies adopted against their preferences. The 2016 UK referendum resolved this conflict by the UK acting legitimately by EU standards, invoking Article 50 to withdraw from the EU. However, most national referendums threaten something else: a challenge to EU legitimacy by a country that proposes to remain an EU member state. This paper will contrast older theories of how EU institutions legitimately represent states and their citizens with new challenges arising from the demand for and use of national referendums; explain why this demand is rising as an alternative to the electoral challenge of protest parties; and discuss the alternative strategies that the EU has adopted in response, and their consequences.Brexit, referendums, EU integrationUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Brexit’s Contested European PastsRieke TRIMÇEV, Universität Greifswald, rieke.trimcev@uni-greifswald.de, Félix KRAWATZEK, Nuffield College, University of OxfordIn the wake of the Brexit vote, the Independent warned about the short institutional memory which contributed to forgetting the EU’s “staggering achievements”. The referendum on Britain’s future relationship with the EU exposed domestic as well as continental audiences to a politics of contingency: before and after the vote, ‘Brexit’ signified a future beyond political imagination, a rupture in time. “Brexit means Brexit” is only the most prominent attempt to cover this great unknown. References to a shared past became an important means in negotiating the meaning of and response to the referendum. However, Brexit is itself part of a gradual divide between Britain and the EU and diverging narratives about the idea and memory of Europe. This paper builds on a larger research which compares the role of ‘Europe’ in memory discourses in six different European countries between 2004 and 2016. Our corpus consists of articles from major daily newspapers and is analysed through a combination of qualitative content analysis and quantitative text analysis. The combination of these methods allows for an analysis of continuous and changing discursive patterns. Studying this corpus allows us to shed light on three questions in particular: How does the image of Europe presented in Britain differ from that in other EU countries? Which other memory strategies became visible in the UK? How can a comparison with the discourses around the earlier EU referenda of 2005 in France and the Netherlands contribute to our understanding of Brexit?Brexit, media, attitudes towards EU, referendumsCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Gendering Brexit: Is There Room for Equality?Roberta GUERRINA, University of Surrey, r.guerrina@surrey.ac.ukThis paper explores the gendered nature of the EU Referendum Campaigns and the impact of gender framings in the campaign rhetoric on determining the position of gender equality policies in Brexit negotiations. Considering the EU is widely accepted as a gender actor, particularly in the context of employment policy, the marginality of these issues in the debate reflect a hierarchy in the value attributed to different policy areas that crystallizes the high-low politics binary. European led initiatives have undoubtedly changed the nature of equality policies in the Member States. European Directives and Regulations have created a safety net that safeguards women’s access and position in the labour market, whereas soft policy measures provided opportunities for norm diffusion and transfer of best practice. Recent studies have also outlined how, and to what extent, EU policy contributes to shifts in gender regimes, gender policy and gender relations at the national level (Lombardo & Forrest, 2012; Annesley & Scheele, 2011). Women in the UK have benefited greatly from membership of the EU/EEC in as far as it expedited the ratification of equal pay legislation in the early 1970s and provided a framework for the expansion of maternity rights in the 1990s (Guerrina, 2005; Caracciolo di Torrella & Masselot, 2010). The Brexit referendum therefore provides a unique opportunity to reflect on the relationship, and patterns of influence, between European and national legislation.Brexit, gender, women, EU membershipCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Watching the Gathering Storm: The EU Seen through Party Manifestos 2010 to 2015Ruth BREEZE, University of Navarra, rbreeze@unav.esThe Brexit vote came as a shock to many observers, but can be situated within a longer‐term trend of Euro‐scepticism among UK politicians which appears to have been accentuated after the financial crisis of 2008. This paper uses discourse analysis supported by corpus linguistic techniques to trace patterns in the way the EU is represented in election manifestos from the major British political parties (Conservative, Labour, LibDem, UKIP, Green, SNP and Plaid Cymru) from the 2010 and 2015 elections. In particular, an increasingly hostile attitude towards the EU is found in the Conservative manifestos, linked to a critique of the Labour party’s supposed pro‐EU stance. Interestingly, those references to the EU which are not critical are generally framed competitively, with frequent use of superlatives to assert the superiority of some aspect of the UK over the rest of Europe. Over the same time period, discourses on migration associated with EU countries also took on greater importance in both Labour and Conservative discourses. However, non‐UK‐wide parties adopted a very different discursive stance. In particular, around the years of the Scottish Referendum, the SNP developed a representation of Scotland as an “EU nation” operating on an equal footing with other EU countries, which runs in parallel with a heightened focus of discontent centring on “Westminster”. The evidence from these texts sheds considerable insight into the years immediately before the EU Referendum campaign, and suggests that the tensions and divisions observed there had been intensifying dramatically during that period.political parties, Brexit, attitudes towards EU, ScotlandCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
An Alternative to Representation: Preferences for Citizens As Political Decision-Makers in GermanySergiu GHERGHINA, Goethe University Frankfurt, ghergina@soz.uni-frankfurt.de, Brigitte GEISSEL, Goethe University Frankfurt, geissel@soz.uni-frankfurt.deIn recent decades increasing attention is dedicated in the literature to citizens’ preferences for alternative models of political decision-making. Most of these studies either tried to describe these preferences or to link them with political behavior. However, it only marginally referred to who these citizens are and why they display a certain preference. To partially address this void in the literature, our paper investigates the determinants of preferences for citizens as decision-makers by using individual-level data from a survey conducted in autumn 2014 on a probability representative sample in Germany. The survey answers indicate that almost one quarter of the respondents (approximately 700) have a clear preference towards citizens as decision-makers while the rest either favor representative / expert democracy or have mixed preferences. Our paper tests the extent to which interest in politics, media consumption, civic engagement, and socio-economic status (SES) can explain the preference for citizens as decision-makers. The results indicate that low satisfaction with democracy, a heavy critique of the Parliament as the main law-making body, and high interest in politics are more likely to favor the preference for citizens as decision-makers. At the same time, the SES factors do not play a role in this preference, i.e. rich people, less educated and older do not prefer citizens as decision-makers.referendums, democracy, political decision-makers, political participation, GermanyCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, 12-14 July 2017, Glasgow
The Limited Impact of Negative Social Media Campaigning in the UK's EU ReferendumSimon USHERWOOD, University of Surrey, s.usherwood@surrey.ac.uk, Katharine WRIGHT, Newcastle University The 2016 EU referendum was typical of such exercises in the mobilisation of a very wide range of subjects and approaches to secure a victory by both sides, often with only limited relevance to the nominal question on the ballot paper. One aspect of this was the continued use of negative campaigning – that is, ad hominem attacks on opponents – as a means of discrediting the other side and to reinforce more positive associations among one’s own supporters. This paper explores how this negative campaigning approach fitted into the Twitter activity of the main groups in the referendum and the degree to which the public engaged with it. The results highlight the limited capacity for negative campaigning to work in this environment and highlights the limitations of constructing and supporting spaces for constructive debate on European integration.media, social media, Brexit, referendumsUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Euroscepticism in the Brexit Era: Anxiety, Rage and UncertaintySimona GUERRA, University of Leicester, gs219@leicester.ac.uk‘Quo vadis Europa?’ addressed Joschka Fischer, in a personal speech, as German Foreign Minister at Humboldt University in Berlin, in May 2000. It was a call to Europeans, as they ‘would have to give… onwards to the completion of European integration. A step backwards, even just stand still or contentment with what has been achieved, would demand a fatal price of all EU Member States and of all those who want to become Members.’ A few years on, the EU enlarged eastwards and southeastward, but Europeans seem to lag behind or, simply, did not follow. While studies examine the spiral of Euroscepticism emerging across traditional and new media, with negativity bias and misrepresentation, the persistence and embeddedness of Euroscepticism, alternative forms and understandings of opposition to the EU, this paper investigates the role of emotions on public attitudes towards the EU. An analysis of original data on the British referendum (23 June 2016) shows that the ‘Remain’ campaign seemed not to gain momentum, while the ‘Leave’ campaign was successful in evoking citizens’ emotions. Leave voters seem to be more driven by anger, while uncertainty spreads among those who are likely to have voted ‘Remain’, and young people feel both uncertain and anxious. This paper examines the role of subjective evaluations and emotions on attitudes towards the EU and to what extent these can drive Euroscepticism and behaviours.attitudes towards EU, Brexit, Euroscepticism, European integrationCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
The Emerging Constitutional Crisis in the UKSoeren KEIL, Canterbury Christ Church University, soeren.keil@canterbury.ac.ukThis paper will focus on the evolving constitutional crisis in the United Kingdom, which is a result of the differentiated outcome of the vote in the different parts of the UK. While voters in England and Wales voted for the UK to leave the EU, nearly two-thirds of voters in Scotland, and over 55% of voters in Northern Ireland voted to remain in the UK. This has resulted in deeper divisions in Northern Ireland, where Sinn Fein supported EU Membership but their coalition partner, the DUP supported BREXIT. These deepening divisions, amongst other main issues, have resulted in the breakdown of the power-sharing agreement in Belfast in January 2017.In Scotland, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has made it clear that she will not watch as Scotland is being dragged out of the EU against its will. She has openly discussed the option of either a special status for Scotland (so it could remain a part of the Single Market), or the possibility of a second independence referendum. However the Brexit negotiations between the UK and the rest of the EU will unfold, the Brexit vote has already had a profound impact on UK politics. A constitutional crisis is glooming, with power-sharing in Northern Ireland put in questions and relations with the Republic of Ireland hanging in the balance. In Scotland, a renewed interest in independence has also resulted in a more confrontations between elites in Westminster and Holyrood. This paper will look at the emerging constitutional crisis in the UK and highlight which challenges this poses to the UK government, which not only needs to find common ground with their European partners in the Brexit negotiations, but also needs to be able to sell any deals to their home nations. It will evaluate what the framework of such a solution could be and what the prospects of the UK breaking-apart as a result of the Brexit vote are.Brexit, Scotland, Northern IrelandUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Europe’s Britain: Brexit Through the Eyes of the Rest of EuropeTim OLIVER, LSE IDEAS, t.l.oliver@lse.ac.ukBritain’s relations with the EU and Europe more broadly have often been written about from the perspective of the UK. Current debates about the UK’s new relationship with the EU – a Norway, Switzerland or free trade model etc – all focus on what is best for the UK. What does the rest of Europe think about Britain and its place in Europe? How has the British vote to leave the EU changed European integration? Has it made it more likely that the EU will disintegrate or integrate? Or will the EU muddle through Brexit as it has so many other challenges, coping with it but not solving the problems it presents? This paper builds on two ongoing projects: a book project on European views of Britain's place in European politics and a series of reports compiled through a network across the EU in which contributors outline national views of ongoing UK-EU relations, with a particular focus on the recent renegotiation, referendum and now Brexit. The paper will look at views of the UK in terms of national debates and pan-European debates, and look at views from other European states such as Russia and Turkey. The paper will examine how important Britain has been for the rest of Europe in pushing forward or limiting European integration and shaping European politics more broadly.Brexit, European integration, Norway, Switzerland, attitudes towards UKCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Scotland’s Place in Europe After Brexit: Between a Rock and a Hard Place? A Legal Scoping ExerciseTobias LOCK, Edinburgh Law School, tobias.lock@ed.ac.uk Tobias LOCK, Edinburgh Law School, tobias.lock@ed.ac.uk Brexit, Scotland, attitudes towards EUEuropean Union Studies Association, 15th Biennial Conference, May 2017, Miami, FL, USA
Where Will It End? Towards a New Scottish Devolution Settlement in the Aftermath of BrexitTomasz CZAPIEWSKI, Szczecin University, tomekczapiewski@gmail.comIn the aftermath of the Brexit vote in June 2016, reform of the devolution settlement in Scotland seems to be inevitable. This paper will examine the scope of this change and its likely influence on the Scottish political system. The paper begins with by analysing the current devolution settlement, including the changes resulting from the Scotland Act 2012 and the Scotland Act 2016. The UK's withdrawal from the EU is likely to result in significant policy responsibilities being transferred to Scottish Parliament, most probably the ambits of justice, home affairs, agriculture, fisheries and the environment. In addition, it seems, that Scotland may have rather negligible influence on the process and the final shape of Brexit. Moreover, transfer of powers will require serious renegotiation of Scotland's fiscal framework. This paper explores the possible variants of constitutional reform for Scotland and focuses not only on the devolved matters repatriated from EU, but also on "repatriated competences in reserved area" and "additional powers to protect Scotland's interests" as the Scottish Government's paper 'Scotland's Place in Europe' put it. Are these Scottish Government's proposals politically possible? The answer to this question will be illustrated by analysing the relationship between the Scottish and British governments after the Brexit referendum. The Paper concludes that rethinking devolution would find more friendly reception in Westminster than any type of asymmetrical bespoke arrangement for Scotland in the context of the EU. For Westminster, and indeed the territorial politics of the UK as a whole, the success of this reform is of indisputable importance; it may be the most important factor in averting another independence referendum.Scotland, BrexitUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Remain or Abstain? How Did UK Environmental NGOs Engage with the Bright Side of the EUViviane GRAVEY, Queen's University Belfast, v.gravey@qub.ac.uk, Nathalie BERNY, Sciences Po BordeauxIt is widely acknowledged that Environmental NGOs (ENGO) have played a key part in the development of a policy that remains greatly valued by EU citizens. The difficulties faced by British environmental NGOs in the EU referendum campaign questions however the sustainability of a policy which needs support beyond the Brussels ‘bubble’. The recent EU referendum posed a quandary to the UK ENGO sector: on the one hand, it had profoundly engaged with the European Union over the last forty years – from lobbying for policy change to using EU legal remedies against pollution and habitats destruction. On the other hand, environmental NGOs, despite their large membership base, have struggled to be heard in broader societal debates. As such, the UK ENGO sector stood to lose either EU rules and governance mechanisms by abstaining from a pro-EU stance, or support from a broad swath of the British electorate if supporting Remain. This paper compares how different groups such as WWF UK, Friends of the Earth EWNI, RSPB and the National Trust grappled with this dilemma and chose whether and how to engage with European issues. Drawing on literature on organizational sociology and social movements, it analyses how the different groups defined their referendum strategy internally and in coordination across the ENGO sector and how they communicated on European questions with their members and the broader public. Our analysis builds on both a study of the materials produced by the different groups and a series of interviews within the ENGO sector.Brexit, environment, NGOsCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Brexit in the Classroom: Teaching the EU in the UK after the ReferendumViviane GRAVEY, Queen’s University Belfast, v.gravey@qub.ac.uk, Anna WAMBACH, Newcastle UniversityTeaching European Studies has long been an exercise in teaching crises - from the 'No' votes to the Constitutional Treaty, to the Eurozone crisis, to the ongoing refugee crisis - and in discussing how the EU is, or is not, dealing with them. Is Brexit yet another crisis to incorporate into our teaching, or will it redefine how European Studies is taught, at least in the UK?This paper showcases results of an online survey of UK-based academics teaching university EU modules. It investigates how teaching practices are evolving in the post-referendum UK, in terms of module content (reading lists, assessment format, teaching innovations), collaboration across disciplines, student participation in the classroom, module enrolment numbers and institutional support. As UACES celebrates its 50th anniversary, this paper contributes to reflections on the future of European Studies in the UK - is Brexit a boon or a bane? - and to a broader literature in teaching political science and IR with suddenly newsworthy topics.education, Brexit, mediaUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Remain or Abstain? How Did UK Environmental NGOs Engage with the Bright Side of the EUViviane GRAVEY, Queen’s University Belfast, v.gravey@qub.ac.uk, Nathalie BERNY, Sciences Po Bordeaux The recent EU referendum posed a quandary to the UK ENGO sector: on the one hand, it had profoundly engaged with the European Union over the last forty years - from lobbying for policy change to using EU legal remedies against pollution and habitats destruction. On the other hand, environmental NGOs, despite their large membership base, have struggled to be heard in broader societal debates. As such, the UK ENGO sector stood to lose either EU rules and governance mechanisms by abstaining from a pro¬EU stance, or support from a broad swath of the British electorate if supporting Remain. This paper compares how different groups such as WWF UK, Friends of the Earth EWNI, RSPB and the National Trust grappled with this dilemma and chose whether and how to engage with European issues. Drawing on literature on organizational sociology and social movements, it analyses how the different groups defined their referendum strategy internally and in coordination across the ENGO sector and how they communicated on European questions with their members and the broader public. Our analysis builds on both a study of the materials produced by the different groups and a series of interviews within the ENGO sector.Brexit, NGOs, environmentUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Europeanisation of Media Discourse? Brexit Discourses in the Polish
Press
Katarzyna ANDREJUK, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw,
kandrejuk@ifispan.waw.pl
The results of the United Kingdom EU membership referendum in June
2016 have met with great media resonance abroad. The aim of the
presentation is to analyse the discourse about Britain's exit from the European
Union in the Polish press. Scrutinised will be the diversification of topics and
social/political meanings associated with Brexit. The Brexit was mostly
analysed from the perspective of Poland's state interests and potential losses
and gains on the national (Polish and UK) levels. The most visible topics
included the anticipated changes in migration patterns to/from the UK,
challenges to freedom of movement of goods and services, meaning of Brexit
in the context of political shift to the right wing parties and populist
movements. The analysis will encompass the discourses presented in the
press titles associated with various sides of the left-right political spectrum.
The question will be asked whether the dominant press discourse
demonstrated a pro-European approach to the political turmoil, or it was more
mixed depending on the political views represented by certain media.
media, Brexit, Poland, EuropeanisationUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Challenging the Narrative of the Left Behind Brexiter,Lorenza
ANTONUCCI, no affiliation given, l.antonucci@bham.ac.uk, Laszio
HORVATH, no affiliation given, André KROUWEL, Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam
The result of the UK’s referendum on the EU has sparked much interest
on the socio-economic characteristics of Brexiters and their malaise vis-à- vis
globalisation. In this article we challenge the popularised view of the Leave
voter as society’s outsider and find that individuals from an intermediate class,
whose malaise is due to a declining financial position, represent an important
segment of the Brexit vote. We use individual-level data from a post-Brexit
survey with post-stratification weights based on the British Election Study. Our
analysis tests three predictive models. First, although our analysis confirms
the negative association between education and Leave vote, it finds that
voting Leave is more associated with intermediate educational levels than
with low or absent education, in particular in the presence of a perceived
declining economic position. Secondly, we find that Brexiters hold distinct

psycho-social features of malaise due to declining economic conditions, rather
than anxiety or anger. Thirdly, our exploratory model finds voting Leave
associated with self-identification with middle class, rather than with working
class. We also find that intermediate levels of income were not more likely to
vote for remain than low income groups. Overall our analysis of the Brexit
vote underlines the importance of considering the political behaviour of the
declining middle.
Brexit, demographic factors, Brexit voters, education,
income, voting behaviour
American Political Science Association, 113th Annual Meeting &
Exhibition, 31 August–3 September 2017, San Francisco
The Angry, the Sad and the Jubilant - A Sentiment Analysis of the House
of Commons Debates on Brexit
Katrin AUEL, Institute for Advanced
Studies, Vienna, auel@ihs.ac.at, Resul UMIT, Institute for Advanced Studies,
Vienna
In early February, the House of Commons debated the European Union
(Notification of Withdrawal) Bill (plus amendments) authorising the British
government to trigger the Article 50 TEU notification. The outcome was never
really in question: MPs were under a strict mandate from both their whips and
their constituencies – 63 per cent of which voted Leave – to trigger the
notification. Yet the debates did provide both Brexit supporters and opponents
with a very public opportunity to express their opinion – not only regarding the
UK’s withdrawal from the Union but also, given the mismatch between their
mandate and conscience, about representation in general. Indeed, while 80
per cent of MPs supported the Bill, only 25 per cent of them had voted Leave
in the Referendum. Rather than analysing the final vote on the bill, the paper
will therefore present a sentiment analysis of the debates. How do MPs feel
about Brexit in general and about possible, positive or negative, effects for the
UK and their citizens? How much confidence do they have in the
government’s plans for the Brexit negotiations? Most importantly, the debates
offer a unique opportunity to analyse the sentiments of MPs about
representation, and especially about acting as agents of their electorate rather
than as trustees: How do they feel about casting a vote in line with their
constituency’s or parties wishes, but possibly against their own stance on
Brexit? To put the findings into perspective, the paper will then conduct a
comparative sentiment analysis of the debates on the referendum bill from
September 2015 to gauge whether and to what extent sentiments regarding
Brexit have changed or even intensified.
Brexit, political decision-making, voting behaviour, UK
House of Commons, Article 50
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Motivated Reasoning and Voter Behaviour in EU ReferendumsDerek
BEACH, University of Aarhus, derek@ps.au.dk, Daniel FINKE, University of
Aarhus
In this paper, we argue that EU-skeptic voters are more likely to
engage in motivated reasoning then EU-friendly voters because of stronger
held underlying attitudes towards the EU. Based on evidence from studies of
EU-skepticism and public opinion towards the EU, we should expect that anti-
EU attitudes are affect-based, meaning that voters would hold them more
strongly (Boomgarden et al. 2011). We assess the effects of stronger held
attitudes on voting behavior, assessing: 1) whether motivated reasoning
reinforces the relevance of issue voting and reduces the relevance of party
endorsements for EU-skeptic respondents (H1), whether EU-skeptic voters
are more certain about what they should vote and they make up their minds
earlier because of motivated reasoning (H2), whether EU-skeptic respondents
are more prone to follow frames that confirm their ideological position (H3),
and whether EU-skeptic voters feel more informed because of their selective
recruitment of evidence (H4). While most of the political psychology literature
that has assessed motivated reasoning effects have utilized experimental
data, we explore whether we find evidence of these effects in a real-world
environment using survey data collected by the authors in the 2015 JHA
referendum in Denmark. We find evidence that suggests that EU-skeptical
voters were more susceptible to arguments that matched their underlying
issue attitudes, were more certain of their vote, and overall engaged in more
issue-voting. The implication of our findings is that more information provided
by a referendum campaign will not necessarily convince skeptics. Indeed, it
might paradoxically make them more certain that they will vote no.
referendums, Brexit, Denmark, Euroscepticism, attitudes
towards EU
European Union Studies Association, 15th Biennial Conference, May
2017, Miami, FL, USA
Losing Control: Brexit, the Eurocrisis and the Demoi-cratic DisconnectRichard BELLAMY, European University Institute, richard.bellamy@eui.euI will address the theme of the end of the market state by examining
Brexit and the Eurocrisis through the lens of what Dani Rodrik calls the
fundamental political trilemma of the world economy: namely, the impossibility
of having globalisation, national self-determination and democracy – only any
two of these three is possible. Brexit was won by offering the British
population the option of combining national self-determination and democracy
without globalisation. Increasingly, though, it seems much more likely it will
offer globalisation and (formal) national self-determination – which was what
many of its advocates (Fox, Johnson and Davis – the ministers now mainly
responsible for Brexit) had wanted all along. By contrast, the EU has often
been seen as a means for having globalisation, and democracy by shifting
democratic control to the EU level and modifying national self-determination.
The Eurocrisis suggests this promise has not been met, and also some of the
difficulties of doing so. Instead the EU is clearly perceived by many (quite a
few Brexit voters included) as promoting global rules and eroding national
democracy without replacing it at the EU level. I shall suggest an alternative
role for the EU, that of allowing for what Rodrik calls ‘smart globalisation’ –

that is multilateral demoi-cratic control of globalisation, in which when
globalisation threatens national self-determination on social rules and welfare
it is globalisation not national diversity that gives way.
Brexit, political decision-making, globalisation, democracy,
European Union
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Sub-State Nationalist and Regionalist Party Strategies on Brexit in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis
Jonathan
BRADBURY, Swansea University, j.p.bradbury@swansea.ac.uk, Alan
CONVERY, University of Edinburgh, Matthew WALL, Swansea University,
Jonathan TONGE, University of Liverpool
The paper will measure and characterise the strategies of nationalist and
regionalist political parties in the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for
Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly on the implementation of Brexit. This
includes a focus on five parties that are organised on a sub-state basis only:
the Scottish National Party; Plaid Cymru; Sinn Fein, the Social Democratic
Labour Party and the Alliance Party in Northern Ireland. It will also include
analysis of branches of British or state wide parties where they have shown
consistent support for the development of self-government in recent times and
currently have elected representatives. These include: in Scotland Scottish
Labour, the Scottish Liberal Democrats, and the Scottish Greens; in Wales
Welsh Labour, and the Welsh Liberal Democrats; and in Northern Ireland the
Green Party. The paper will apply the approach developed by Basile (2016)
for theorising and researching party strategy and specifies a set of issue
dimensions of Brexit party strategy that will be studied for each party. These
dimensions relate first to preferred external relationships to the EU after Brexit
(for example relations with the single market); and then secondly, to desired
internal territorial dimensions of Brexit following its completion (for example
transfer of EU powers to devolved jurisdictions). The paper will measure for
each party first, the saliency attached to this range of issues raised by Brexit,
secondly, the positions they hold on each of these dimensions, and then
thirdly it will consider the way in which those positions are framed. On this
basis it will define parties’ strategies according to a Europhile-Eurosceptic EU
relations scale, as well as a transformative-no change internal territorial
relations scale. The paper will draw on documentary and interview evidence
from both the period prior to and after the triggering of article 50 by the UK
Government. The analysis will compare strategies between parties within
each of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and will seek to clarify the
extent of consensus and the features of party competition in each of the three
devolved jurisdictions over how Brexit should be implemented. It will also
compare across jurisdictions, seeking to clarify comparative findings on how
sub-state nationalist and regionalist parties in the UK seek to both shape the
framework of relationships with the EU after Brexit and exploit opportunities
for self-government and/or independence through Brexit as well as through
subsequent relationships with the EU. More broadly, the paper will assess the
relationship between sub-state nationalist and regionalist party strategies on

the one hand and public attitudes in each of the territories towards leaving the
European Union on the other, recognising that while Scotland and Northern
Ireland had remain majorities Wales did not. The paper will conclude by
reflecting on how sub-state nationalist and regionalist party strategies can be
assessed in terms of the framework of analysis adopted in the paper; as well
as the utility of this framework of analysis for further comparative study of sub-
state nationalist and regionalist parties across the EU.
Brexit, political decision-making, political parties, Scotland,
Wales, Northern Ireland, nationalist parties
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Watching the Gathering Storm: The EU Seen through Party Manifestos
2010 to 2015
Ruth BREEZE, University of Navarra, rbreeze@unav.esThe Brexit vote came as a shock to many observers, but can be
situated within a longer‐term trend of Euro‐scepticism among UK politicians
which appears to have been accentuated after the financial crisis of 2008.
This paper uses discourse analysis supported by corpus linguistic techniques
to trace patterns in the way the EU is represented in election manifestos from
the major British political parties (Conservative, Labour, LibDem, UKIP,
Green, SNP and Plaid Cymru) from the 2010 and 2015 elections. In particular,
an increasingly hostile attitude towards the EU is found in the Conservative
manifestos, linked to a critique of the Labour party’s supposed pro‐EU stance.
Interestingly, those references to the EU which are not critical are generally
framed competitively, with frequent use of superlatives to assert the
superiority of some aspect of the UK over the rest of Europe. Over the same
time period, discourses on migration associated with EU countries also took
on greater importance in both Labour and Conservative discourses. However,
non‐UK‐wide parties adopted a very different discursive stance. In particular,
around the years of the Scottish Referendum, the SNP developed a
representation of Scotland as an “EU nation” operating on an equal footing
with other EU countries, which runs in parallel with a heightened focus of
discontent centring on “Westminster”. The evidence from these texts sheds
considerable insight into the years immediately before the EU Referendum
campaign, and suggests that the tensions and divisions observed there had
been intensifying dramatically during that period.
political parties, Brexit, attitudes towards EU,Scotland
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Article 50 and the Self-Empowerment of the European Parliament in the
Brexit Process
Carlos CLOSA MONTERO, Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Científicas, carlos.closa@csic.es
Article 50 provides the basic rules for the processes of exiting the
European Union. Like almost any other treaty provision, article 50 contains a
significant degree of ambiguity. This offers actors room for interpreting and re-

defining the rules of the game within the existing provisions. The notion of
incomplete contract captures best this situation: power-maximizing actors use
the unavoidable interpretative gaps in intergovernmental agreements in order
to expand their powers. Previous research has shown that the European
Parliament behaves as such a power-maximizer and the case of article 50
(whose role is limited to vote on the withdrawal agreement) offers another
opportunity to flesh out this hypothesis. Starting that limited role, the EP has
expanded it to become a salient player during Brexit negotiations.
Brexit, European Union, Article 50, European ParliamentEuropean Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Where Will It End? Towards a New Scottish Devolution Settlement in the
Aftermath of Brexit
Tomasz CZAPIEWSKI, Szczecin University,
 tomekczapiewski@gmail.com
In the aftermath of the Brexit vote in June 2016, reform of the
devolution settlement in Scotland seems to be inevitable. This paper will
examine the scope of this change and its likely influence on the Scottish
political system. The paper begins with by analysing the current devolution
settlement, including the changes resulting from the Scotland Act 2012 and
the Scotland Act 2016. The UK's withdrawal from the EU is likely to result in
significant policy responsibilities being transferred to Scottish Parliament,
most probably the ambits of justice, home affairs, agriculture, fisheries and the
environment. In addition, it seems, that Scotland may have rather negligible
influence on the process and the final shape of Brexit. Moreover, transfer of
powers will require serious renegotiation of Scotland's fiscal framework. This
paper explores the possible variants of constitutional reform for Scotland and
focuses not only on the devolved matters repatriated from EU, but also on
"repatriated competences in reserved area" and "additional powers to protect
Scotland's interests" as the Scottish Government's paper 'Scotland's Place in
Europe' put it. Are these Scottish Government's proposals politically possible?
The answer to this question will be illustrated by analysing the relationship
between the Scottish and British governments after the Brexit referendum.
The Paper concludes that rethinking devolution would find more friendly
reception in Westminster than any type of asymmetrical bespoke arrangement
for Scotland in the context of the EU. For Westminster, and indeed the
territorial politics of the UK as a whole, the success of this reform is of
indisputable importance; it may be the most important factor in averting
another independence referendum.
Scotland, BrexitUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Digital Architectures and Deliberative Potentials: Citizen Debate on
Facebook and Twitter During the Brexit Campaign
Anamaria DUTCEAC
SEGESTEN, Lund University, anamaria.dutceac_segesten@eu.lu.se, Michael
BOSSETTA, University of Copenhagen
Because of social media, traditional models of campaigning are
undergoing a transformation: information is abundant, misinformation goes
unchecked, and citizens’ voices are more salient in the public sphere.
However, social media platforms have different ‘digital architectures’ - the
technological structures that facilitate and constrain user behavior. While
much academic focus has been given to studying political campaigning on
social media, few studies focus on citizens and even fewer take into account
how the digital architectures of a medium impact the quality of deliberative
debate online. Using the 2016 Brexit campaign as a case study, the proposed
paper compares how the Leave and Remain positions were discussed on
Facebook and Twitter. We argue that these platforms’ potential for acting as
deliberative arenas varies depending on their digital architectures (i.e. their
feed algorithms, the ‘Friend’ or ‘Follower’ relationship, and the degree of
visibility of their posts). We test this argument by comparing, over the entire
duration of the campaign, citizens’ comments made to the public Facebook
pages of the Leave and Remain campaigns, as well as citizens’ Twitter
messages using the corresponding hashtags on Twitter. Using supervised
machine learning methods in R, we identify discursive frames indicating
homophily among users (e.g. agreement) or heterogeneity (e.g.
disagreement). We expect to find that Facebook is more likely to host
discussions among like-minded users (homophily), whereas Twitter debates
are more likely to be more confrontational, taking place between users holding
opposing views (heterogeneity). The results are discussed in light of social
media’s democratic potential.
Brexit, media, social media, Facebook, Twitter, democracyCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Anarchism After Brexit (and Before IndyRef 2): On Anarchist
Engagements with Constitutionalism
Benjamin FRANKS, University of
Glasgow, Benjamin.Franks@glasgow.ac.uk
Anarchism has frequently been distinguished from other members of
socialist tradition through its hostility to constitutional activity. Criticisms of
state-centred decision-making have been a core feature of anarchism from
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin and Emma Goldman to the present
day. Anarchist critiques concentrate not only on the deficiencies of
representative politics: generation of hierarchies, corruption of benevolent,
productive  social practices but also the benefits of anarchism’s diverse, fluid
and accessible forms of political decision-making across diverse terrains for
local and trans-national social organisation. The critique of electoralism is a
highlighted in anarchist abstentionist and anti-election campaigns (for
instance from the Anti-Elections Alliance and Angry not Apathetic). However,
there have been minority traditions within anarchism that has engaged in
democratic activism. This paper examines the three main positions on
anarchist engagements in representative democracy: 1. Horizontal, Structural
Reformism; 2. Revolutionary (Anti-) Representation and 3. Guerrilla Activism.
In particular it examines these models of anti-state constitutional engagement
as to how they apply to direct rather than representative elections. The paper

uses the debates around the Scottish Independence referendum (2014) and
the referendum on membership of the European Union (2016) as key
examples, but also draws on anarchist engagements in referendum
campaigns in other EU and continental European countries such as the Irish
Republic and Switzerland. It concentrates on answering the questions as:
whether forms of anti-state electoral engagement can successfully avoid the
criticisms anarchists make of state-centred democracy? And what are the
impacts of electoral participation on formally diverse, anti-hierarchical social
organisation?
Brexit, political decision-making, activism, Ireland,
Switzerland, UK, anarchism
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, 12-14 July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Examination of Discourses in the Referendums, and How They Built up,
or Questioned, Romanticised Nationalisms
Leigh FRENCH, Glasgow
School of Art, L.French1@student.gsa.ac.uk
During the referendum, from an anti-capitalist standpoint, Gordon
Asher and Leigh French denounced the consensus whereby independence
and participation in the campaign were ‘posited as ipso facto “progressive”’ in
ways that elided struggles for social justice and empowerment.   I am
interested in examining the ways in which both pro-independence discourses
produced in the run-up to the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and
discourses in favour of Brexit before and after the 2016 referendum share
common ground in furthering such elision on two points. On the one hand,
through the pursuit of nation-states as independent / insulated from supra-
national institutions of governance as the emancipatory way out of austerity
they both put the national(ist) aspect of capitalism beyond contestation. On
the other hand, both sets of narratives empty out class  a category of struggle
at multiple scales while elevating institutions are the terrain and agents of
conflict, and thus as the recipient of citizens’ loyalty. Consideration of the
ways in which autonomous movements and collectives have been operating
in Scotland within (post-)referendum contexts – in terms of the limits,
tensions, and possibilities involved – affords a way of putting pressure, from
an anti-capitalist autonomist perspective, on the logics and politics that clash
with those informing pro-independence and Brexit discourses. <with Arianna
Introna>
referendums, nationalism, attitudes towards EU, Scotland,
Scottish independence
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Brexit and EU Citizenship: The Construction of European Solidarity in
Germany Following the UK Referendum
Charlotte GALPIN, University of
Copenhagen, c.galpin@hum.ku.dk
The ‘Leave’ vote in the UK referendum on EU membership shocked
the continent. Already beset by a number of crises, EU leaders quickly moved
into crisis management mode. The first priority for the EU was to maintain
unity amongst the remaining member states. Discussion immediately turned
to ‘solidarity between the EU27’ and the need to ensure the UK left the EU as
quickly as possible. Through political claims-making analysis of public sphere
debates, using Germany as a case study on account of the important role it
will play in Brexit negotiations, this paper will analyse elite actor claims about
European solidarity in the months following the referendum. While intended to
assuage uncertainty and prevent contagion, these moves raise fundamental
questions about European solidarity and EU citizenship at this unprecedented
time. In legal terms, EU citizenship is derived from national citizenship. The
EU has, however, stated that EU citizenship is a tool for the development of
European identity. In practice, many British EU citizens have taken advantage
of these rights and become reliant on freedom of movement and the principle
of non-discrimination. Until the UK formally leaves, it remains a full member of
the EU. This paper therefore examines the public opinions about Brexit made
by EU actors in Germany and, by analysing actor frames, identify models of
European solidarity constructed in the Brexit debate. Are there public
expressions of solidarity with British EU citizens as Europeans? Alternatively,
are conceptions of European solidarity limited to the EU27?
Brexit, Germany, citizenship, European identity, freedom of
movement, referendum, attitudes towards EU
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Opening the Pandora’s Box of EU Citizenship: Online Mobilisation
During Brexit
Charlotte GALPIN, University of Copenhagen,
c.a.galpin@bham.ac.uk, Verena BRÄNDLE, University of Copenhagen, Hans-
Jörg TRENZ, University of Copenhagen
The UK can be considered ‘the most deeply integrated member state’ in
terms of freedom of movement (Favel, 2014). 3.5 million non-British EU
citizens are estimated to be living in the UK, with 1.2 million British citizens
living in other EU countries. With the UK’s vote to leave the EU in a
referendum in June 2016, a Pandora’s box of EU citizenship has been
opened. For the first time, the possibility of a withdrawal of EU citizenship
from EU citizens en masse is looming. The referendum vote has resulted in
the launch of new social media campaigns that aim to keep Britain in the EU
despite the vote and protect the rights of EU citizens, alongside counter
campaigns that push for the trigger of Article 50 and/or a hard Brexit. This
paper uses a mixed methods design to examine how EU citizenship is
defended and contested during Brexit. Firstly, it offers quantitative analysis of
Facebook pages to identify the kinds of issues and themes that are raised in
online spaces with regards to Brexit and the demographics of those who
participate. Secondly, through in-depth interviews with those engaged in the
campaigns, we seek to understand how people perceive (the loss of) EU
citizenship and narrate their experiences of Brexit and their European and
national identities. By investigating how EU citizenship is understood when it

is under threat, we can understand its subjective meaning beyond its legal
status and associated rights.
Brexit, European Union, citizenship, voting behaviourEuropean Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Brexit in the Classroom: Teaching the EU in the UK after the
Referendum
Viviane GRAVEY, Queen’s University Belfast,
v.gravey@qub.ac.uk, Anna WAMBACH, Newcastle University
Teaching European Studies has long been an exercise in teaching
crises - from the 'No' votes to the Constitutional Treaty, to the Eurozone crisis,
to the ongoing refugee crisis - and in discussing how the EU is, or is not,
dealing with them. Is Brexit yet another crisis to incorporate into our teaching,
or will it redefine how European Studies is taught, at least in the UK?This
paper showcases results of an online survey of UK-based academics
teaching university EU modules. It investigates how teaching practices are
evolving in the post-referendum UK, in terms of module content (reading lists,
assessment format, teaching innovations), collaboration across disciplines,
student participation in the classroom, module enrolment numbers and
institutional support. As UACES celebrates its 50th anniversary, this paper
contributes to reflections on the future of European Studies in the UK - is
Brexit a boon or a bane? - and to a broader literature in teaching political
science and IR with suddenly newsworthy topics.
education, Brexit, mediaUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Remain or Abstain? How Did UK Environmental NGOs Engage with the
Bright Side of the EU
Viviane GRAVEY, Queen's University Belfast,
v.gravey@qub.ac.uk, Nathalie BERNY, Sciences Po Bordeaux
It is widely acknowledged that Environmental NGOs (ENGO) have
played a key part in the development of a policy that remains greatly valued
by EU citizens. The difficulties faced by British environmental NGOs in the EU
referendum campaign questions however the sustainability of a policy which
needs support beyond the Brussels ‘bubble’. The recent EU referendum
posed a quandary to the UK ENGO sector: on the one hand, it had profoundly
engaged with the European Union over the last forty years – from lobbying for
policy change to using EU legal remedies against pollution and habitats
destruction. On the other hand, environmental NGOs, despite their large
membership base, have struggled to be heard in broader societal debates. As
such, the UK ENGO sector stood to lose either EU rules and governance
mechanisms by abstaining from a pro-EU stance, or support from a broad
swath of the British electorate if supporting Remain. This paper compares
how different groups such as WWF UK, Friends of the Earth EWNI, RSPB
and the National Trust grappled with this dilemma and chose whether and
how to engage with European issues. Drawing on literature on organizational
sociology and social movements, it analyses how the different groups defined

their referendum strategy internally and in coordination across the ENGO
sector and how they communicated on European questions with their
members and the broader public. Our analysis builds on both a study of the
materials produced by the different groups and a series of interviews within
the ENGO sector.
Brexit, environment, NGOsCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Remain or Abstain? How Did UK Environmental NGOs Engage with the
Bright Side of the EU
Viviane GRAVEY, Queen’s University Belfast,
v.gravey@qub.ac.uk, Nathalie BERNY, Sciences Po Bordeaux
The recent EU referendum posed a quandary to the UK ENGO sector:
on the one hand, it had profoundly engaged with the European Union over the
last forty years - from lobbying for policy change to using EU legal remedies
against pollution and habitats destruction. On the other hand, environmental
NGOs, despite their large membership base, have struggled to be heard in
broader societal debates. As such, the UK ENGO sector stood to lose either
EU rules and governance mechanisms by abstaining from a proÂEU stance,
or support from a broad swath of the British electorate if supporting Remain.
This paper compares how different groups such as WWF UK, Friends of the
Earth EWNI, RSPB and the National Trust grappled with this dilemma and
chose whether and how to engage with European issues. Drawing on
literature on organizational sociology and social movements, it analyses how
the different groups defined their referendum strategy internally and in
coordination across the ENGO sector and how they communicated on
European questions with their members and the broader public. Our analysis
builds on both a study of the materials produced by the different groups and a
series of interviews within the ENGO sector.
Brexit, NGOs, environmentUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Euroscepticism in the Brexit Era: Anxiety, Rage and UncertaintySimona
GUERRA, University of Leicester, gs219@leicester.ac.uk
‘Quo vadis Europa?’ addressed Joschka Fischer, in a personal speech,
as German Foreign Minister at Humboldt University in Berlin, in May 2000. It
was a call to Europeans, as they ‘would have to give… onwards to the
completion of European integration. A step backwards, even just stand still or
contentment with what has been achieved, would demand a fatal price of all
EU Member States and of all those who want to become Members.’ A few
years on, the EU enlarged eastwards and southeastward, but Europeans
seem to lag behind or, simply, did not follow. While studies examine the spiral
of Euroscepticism emerging across traditional and new media, with negativity
bias and misrepresentation, the persistence and embeddedness of
Euroscepticism, alternative forms and understandings of opposition to the EU,
this paper investigates the role of emotions on public attitudes towards the

EU. An analysis of original data on the British referendum (23 June 2016)
shows that the ‘Remain’ campaign seemed not to gain momentum, while the
‘Leave’ campaign was successful in evoking citizens’ emotions. Leave voters
seem to be more driven by anger, while uncertainty spreads among those
who are likely to have voted ‘Remain’, and young people feel both uncertain
and anxious. This paper examines the role of subjective evaluations and
emotions on attitudes towards the EU and to what extent these can drive
Euroscepticism and behaviours.
attitudes towards EU, Brexit, Euroscepticism, European
integration
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Gendering Brexit: Is There Room for Equality?Roberta GUERRINA,
University of Surrey, r.guerrina@surrey.ac.uk
This paper explores the gendered nature of the EU Referendum
Campaigns and the impact of gender framings in the campaign rhetoric on
determining the position of gender equality policies in Brexit negotiations.
Considering the EU is widely accepted as a gender actor, particularly in the
context of employment policy, the marginality of these issues in the debate
reflect a hierarchy in the value attributed to different policy areas that
crystallizes the high-low politics binary. European led initiatives have
undoubtedly changed the nature of equality policies in the Member States.
European Directives and Regulations have created a safety net that
safeguards women’s access and position in the labour market, whereas soft
policy measures provided opportunities for norm diffusion and transfer of best
practice. Recent studies have also outlined how, and to what extent, EU
policy contributes to shifts in gender regimes, gender policy and gender
relations at the national level (Lombardo & Forrest, 2012; Annesley &
Scheele, 2011). Women in the UK have benefited greatly from membership of
the EU/EEC in as far as it expedited the ratification of equal pay legislation in
the early 1970s and provided a framework for the expansion of maternity
rights in the 1990s (Guerrina, 2005; Caracciolo di Torrella & Masselot, 2010).
The Brexit referendum therefore provides a unique opportunity to reflect on
the relationship, and patterns of influence, between European and national
legislation.
Brexit, gender, women, EU membershipCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
‘Let’s Take Back Control’ and Other Effective Bullshit: Immigration in
the European Union Referendum Campaign
James
HAMPSHIRE, University of Sussex, J.A.Hampshire@sussex.ac.uk
Immigration was central to the EU referendum campaign, and played
an important if not decisive role in the outcome. This paper examines public
statements on immigration during the campaign through the lens of political

bullshit. As defined by Harry Frankfurt, bullshit is a mode of discourse
unrelated to truth-values, and it is prevalent in politics. While the liar pays
indirect homage to truth by consciously telling untruths, the bullshitter speaks
without regard for truth-values. Hopkin and Rosamond argue that political
bullshit is often effective because it is difficult to refute empirically. This paper
traces the EU referendum campaign from its focus on the Remainers’
preferred territory of the economic effects of Brexit – in which empirical claim
and counter-claim predominated – through to a debate centred on the Leave
campaign’s key message of ‘taking back control’, which became increasingly
focused on immigration control. The paper investigates how the debate
shifted not only in terms of issues but also qualitatively: away from empirical
claims and predictions, towards an explicitly anti-expert and post-truth form of
politics in which the Leave campaign successfully articulated a Brexit
narrative in empowering and emotionally reassuring language, largely
impervious to factual refutation; in other words, as bullshit. This proved to be
an effective strategy for the Leave campaign, while Remain were unable to
mount a compelling counter-argument. The argument draws on analysis of a
corpus of public statements from the campaign, including speeches and
interviews by leading politicians, televised debates, campaign posters and
leaflets, and press releases.
Brexit, discourse analysis, immigration, political bullshitCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
State-wide Parties as Regional Parties? Englishness, Brexit and the UK
Party System
Ailsa HENDERSON, University of Edinburgh,
ailsa.henderson@ed.ac.uk, Charlie JEFFERY, University of Edinburgh
The rise of English national identity has implications for the internal
constitutional arrangements of the UK state as well as for views on UK
membership of the European Union. We know, for example, that those who
prioritise their sense of English national identity are simultaneously less
sympathetic to the existing devolution settlement and less sympathetic to EU
membership. UK political parties have sought, to varying extents and with
carrying degrees of success, to politicise English national identity, casting
policy goals in a regional light and making specific appeals to those who
prioritise a sense of Englishness. The rise of English national identity offers
significant challenges to parties seeking to appeal to voters across the UK as
a whole. While the Conservative party appears to have used such appeals to
prevent disaffected voters from supporting UKIP, the Labour Party has
managed rather less well to appeal to those prioritising their English identity.
Using data from the most recent round of the Future of England Survey
(FoES), as well as trend FoES data from 2011 onwards, the paper explores
how UK state-wide parties have, on the terrain of Englishness, English
governance and Brexit, behaved more like regional parties, employing a sub-
state lens through which to evaluate political developments, as well as to
appeal to voters. The paper offers metrics by which we can examine the
extent to which state-wide parties behave as regional parties (drawing on
Brancati’s distinction between regional and regionalist parties) before

analysing the possible consequences of such approaches for the electoral
fortunes of the main UK parties, as well as the UK party system as a whole.
Brexit, political decision-making, immigration, voting
behaviour
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Falling Dominoes? Potential Knock on Effects from Brexit for Other EU
Members
Christine HUEBNER, University of Edinburgh,
Christine.Huebner@ed.ac.uk, Jan EICHHORN, University of Edinburgh,
Daniel KENEALY, University of Edinburgh
In the lead up to the vote of the UK to leave the European Union, many
commentators discussed public opinion within the UK. Much less attention
was paid to political attitudes elsewhere in the EU. Either they were
considered irrelevant, because the decision was considered entirely domestic
or inconsequential, because negotiations between heads of state and
government ultimately were an elite affair. However, in the aftermath of the
decision for Brexit attention for public opinion elsewhere in the EU increased.
This was mainly due to two reasons: it became apparent that leaders in other
member states would go into the UK’s exit negotiations with domestic issues
in mind and that how publics framed the UK’s EU exit domestically would
affect their negotiation positions. Furthermore, the question of a potential
knock-on effect regarding a desire for referenda elsewhere has gained
prominence since. However, there is little survey data that links public
attitudes towards a country’s position in the EU to the concrete considerations
of the UK’s EU referendum. Most available data stem from rather short and
simple polls rather than extensive surveys. This paper will present unique
insights using data from a comprehensive survey (funded by the UK’s
Economic and Social Research Council) conducted in six different member
states (Germany, France, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Poland) in the lead up
to the UK’s EU referendum. Comparing results from across the six different
countries and to UK data we investigate the extent to which people in different
EU countries would like to hold a referendum about their own EU membership
in the first place and, if such a referendum was held, how they would vote.
Using the scope of the survey we investigate which factors are associated
with each of these outcomes in the context of the UK’s EU referendum. In
doing so we pay particular attention to the question whether people who
favour a referendum and people who would vote to leave the EU share similar
characteristics across the six different member states or whether their profiles
differ. Our findings show that both in terms of levels and influencing factors
there is great variation between the different publics investigated. Support for
an own EU referendum varies greatly, with some countries having pluralities
against it, others an overall balanced view and some with clear majorities in
favour. While many who favour a referendum also want their country to leave
the EU, there are significant minorities in all countries that wish to remain but
hold a referendum nevertheless. This suggests that the wish for a vote should
not be conflated with the desire for a particular outcome (although this has
been done in a significant number of commentaries). The factors that

influence whether a person wants to hold a referendum in their country and
wants their country to leave or remain in the EU differ substantially. While
there are some consistent effects (e.g. for certain types of educational
attainment) demographic and attitudinal patterns vary significantly across
member states (such as for age). We distinguish between the effects of
institutional trust, national and European identities, the extent of knowledge
about the European Union as well as left-right attitudes and find that in most
cases the findings are not consistent across member states. These insights
contribute to the debate about differential appraisals of Brexit and to
discussions of different structures of euroscepticism in the member states
during this particular, pivotal moment in the European Union’s history. The
findings also highlight important suggestions for further research which are
discussed in the paper.
Brexit, disintegration, European Union, identity,
euroscepticism, UK, Germany, France, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, Poland,
survey data
American Political Science Association, 113th Annual Meeting &
Exhibition, 31 August–3 September 2017, San Francisco
The Conspicuous Absence of Local Government during the EU
Referendum Campaign
Christopher HUGGINS, Keele University,
c.i.huggins@keele.ac.uk
The voice of local government during the EU referendum campaign
was largely absent. This is surprising given the impact of the EU on English
local government. Local authorities are responsible for the implementation of
70% of EU policy. They are main beneficiary of the EU's Structural and
Investment Funds. EU rules, such as on procurement and state aid, affect the
delivery of local services. Local authorities are also heavily engaged at the
European level, both formally through recognition in the Committee of the
Regions, and informally through Brussels offices to lobby EU institutions and
in transnational networking with other localities to access EU funding,
influence EU policy and share policy innovation with European partners. Local
government was therefore heavily invested in the outcome of the referendum,
yet the local dimension to the UK's relationship with the EU was overlooked
while the campaign was dominated by discussions on national sovereignty,
immigration, economic prosperity and international trade. Drawing on
centralization, local leadership and local level Europeanization literatures, this
paper explores why one of the most Europeanized parts of the British polity
struggled to find a voice and was largely absent from the EU referendum
campaign.
local government, referendums, BrexitUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
How Population Shifts Contributed to BrexitSeth JOLLY, Syracuse
University, skjolly@maxwell.syr.edu
In this article, I evaluate how increased contact with immigrant
populations and utilitarian concerns shape public attitudes toward immigrants
and the European Union in the United Kingdom. In particular, I address the
following question: how does the presence of immigrants in a local community
affect xenophobic attitudes? In turn, how did these demographic changes and
xenophobic attitudes affect Brexit? Beyond the simple number of immigrants, I
also test whether contact has a different effect in districts that experience a
dramatic increase in immigration between census cycles. In other words, if
formerly homogeneous regions suddenly increase to 5 or 10% immigrant
population, that shift may be more likely to affect attitudes than a steady and
long-time immigrant population in greater numbers. Synthesizing public
opinion, economic, and demographic data from 1990–2015, I explore these
questions. By taking advantage of cross-sectional variation in minority
populations, I develop and test hypotheses concerning the presence of
immigrant populations, xenophobic sentiments, and vote for Brexit.
Brexit, political decision-making, immigration, voting
behaviour
American Political Science Association, 113th Annual Meeting &
Exhibition, 31 August–3 September 2017, San Francisco
Brexit: Chance or Challenge for the Central European Euroscepticism?Petr KANIOK, Masaryk University, kaniok@fss.muni.cz, Vit HLOUŠEK,
Masaryk University
The paper analyses salience of Brexit as seen by the soft and hard
Eurosceptic parties in Central-eastern European countries. First aim of the
paper is therefore to summarize and analyse different reactions of these
parties which can adopt different forms starting with conceptualisation of
Brexit as a chance to radicalize its own position on the leave of the EU and
going to taking Brexit as a challenge because of loosening very important
British Eurosceptic allies within the EU and thus facing decreasing pressure
towards the substantial reform of the EU. Second part of the analysis will
connect empirical findings with interpretation based on two categories of
Euroscepticism, a soft and a hard one. We argue that as there is fundamental
difference between the former and the later, reactions of both camps will vary
substantially. While soft Eurosceptics consider Brexit as possibility to reform
the EU, hard Eurosceptics translate it as a call to destroy the EU. Our
research thus contributes to the understanding of party based Euroscepticism,
its empirical analysis and its clearer fundamental conceptualization.
Brexit, political decision-making, immigration, voting
behaviour, euroscepticism
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
From Post-National to Post-European? Young Britons’ Attitudes
towards EU Citizenship and Belonging After the Brexit Referendum
Avril
KEATING, Institute of Education, University of London, avkeating@gmail.com
In this paper I will examine young people’s attitudes towards Brexit, and
to explore their hopes, fears, and aspirations for the future of Britain (and for
their own future in Britain). In the process, I will focus not just on young
Remainers, but also shed much needed light on the young people that
supported Britain leaving the EU. Preliminary analysis of the EU referendum
results indicated that young people under 30 were more likely to vote Remain,
and we know that young people are more likely to report having a post-
national identity that incorporates a European dimension. Furthermore, we
expect that this age group are more likely to be affected by many of the
negative consequences that have been predicted (such as higher
unemployment, and greater restrictions on mobility for study and work, to
name but two). With this paper, therefore, I want to examine young Britons’
attitudes towards the results and its aftermath, their expectations and
aspirations for the future, and whether their identities and sense of belonging
are starting to shift away from the post-national position that we have come to
expect of the younger generation. In other words, are young people becoming
less European, and less tolerant of immigrants? A central aim of this paper
would be to shed light on attitudes and aspirations among the young people
that supported Britain leaving the EU. Although this is a minority position, this
view is one that is held by a substantial minority of young people (c. 30% by
some estimates). This group are not only typically characterised as being ‘left
behind’ by globalisation but they also tend to be overlooked by debates which
instead focus on the position that most young people have taken (i.e. to
support Remain). My previous research suggests that concerns about
immigration may explain their attitudes towards Brexit, EU citizenship, and
sense of belonging; this will be a key issue that will be explored in this paper.
These themes are examined from a qualitative perspective, drawing on 8
focus groups with young adults aged 18-30.
Brexit, immigration, voting behaviour, nationality, citizenshipEuropean Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
The Emerging Constitutional Crisis in the UKSoeren KEIL, Canterbury
Christ Church University, soeren.keil@canterbury.ac.uk
This paper will focus on the evolving constitutional crisis in the United
Kingdom, which is a result of the differentiated outcome of the vote in the
different parts of the UK. While voters in England and Wales voted for the UK
to leave the EU, nearly two-thirds of voters in Scotland, and over 55% of
voters in Northern Ireland voted to remain in the UK. This has resulted in
deeper divisions in Northern Ireland, where Sinn Fein supported EU
Membership but their coalition partner, the DUP supported BREXIT. These
deepening divisions, amongst other main issues, have resulted in the
breakdown of the power-sharing agreement in Belfast in January 2017.In
Scotland, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has made it clear that she will not
watch as Scotland is being dragged out of the EU against its will. She has
openly discussed the option of either a special status for Scotland (so it could
remain a part of the Single Market), or the possibility of a second
independence referendum. However the Brexit negotiations between the UK

and the rest of the EU will unfold, the Brexit vote has already had a profound
impact on UK politics. A constitutional crisis is glooming, with power-sharing in
Northern Ireland put in questions and relations with the Republic of Ireland
hanging in the balance. In Scotland, a renewed interest in independence has
also resulted in a more confrontations between elites in Westminster and
Holyrood. This paper will look at the emerging constitutional crisis in the UK
and highlight which challenges this poses to the UK government, which not
only needs to find common ground with their European partners in the Brexit
negotiations, but also needs to be able to sell any deals to their home nations.
It will evaluate what the framework of such a solution could be and what the
prospects of the UK breaking-apart as a result of the Brexit vote are.
Brexit, Scotland, Northern IrelandUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
For the First Time Here in This Country I Felt Like an Immigrant: Identity,
Citizenship and EU Immigration After the Brexit Referendum
Eleanor
KNOTT, London School of Economics & Political Science,
e.k.knott@lse.ac.uk
The right to remain in the UK, for non-UK EU migrants, is predicated on
freedom of movement and EU citizenship rights; all these rights are now up
for debate as the UK negotiates its future relationship with the EU, following
2016 UK-EU referendum. This paper will use evidence gathered from a
survey, conducted in July-August 2016 (n=3,000), and will focus on
experiences of non-UK EU migrants of the referendum, most of whom do not
hold UK citizenship and could not participate in the referendum. From this
survey, the paper will argue that the EU referendum changed, for many of
those sampled, their idea of the UK, their relationship with the UK and their
identification as immigrants. For many of those sampled, the UK through the
referendum campaign appeared to shift from a tolerant, multi-cultural state
and society, to a society that was critical of EU immigrants (and immigration
more generally) and where anti-immigrant, if not xenophobic and racist
sentiment and actions, have been given a greater, and more legitimate, voice.
In this environment, many non-UK EU citizens felt themselves ‘for the first
time’ as immigrants. The paper will also consider the variation of these
experiences, in particular between individuals from ‘older’ EU member-states
(e.g. Germany), who have resided in the UK for a long period, and individuals
from ‘newer’ EU member-states (e.g. Poland and Romania), whose migration
to the UK is more recent.
Brexit, immigration, nationality, citizenship, freedom of
movement
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Brexit and EU CitizenshipDora KOSTAKOPOULOU, University of
Warwick, D.Kostakopoulou@warwick.ac.uk
Brexit opened the way for the ‘restoration’ of British sovereignty and, if
an EEA model (or an EEA-like model) is not chosen following the activation of
Article 50 TEU, EU citizens settled in the UK will be requested to apply for
either UK nationality or permanent leave to remain. The same applies to UK
nationals residing in other Member States who will lose their EU citizenship
status. Unexpectedly, 3.9 million EU citizens have been transformed into
‘guests’ or ‘foreigners’ in communities they call ‘their own’. Although
naturalisation in the state of residence might be seen to furnish a secure and
fully recognised status for EU citizens, I argue that it is not an adequate policy
option. The conceptual differences between national and EU citizenships are
immense. In this article I explore the advantages and disadvantages of
possible citizenship templates and suggest alternatives.
Brexit, European Union, Article 50, citizenship, immigrationEuropean Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Scotland’s Place in Europe After Brexit: Between a Rock and a Hard
Place? A Legal Scoping Exercise
Tobias LOCK, Edinburgh Law School,
tobias.lock@ed.ac.uk
For lawyers and political scientists alike, the United Kingdom’s (UK)
decision to leave the European Union (EU) following a referendum held on 23
June 2016 is probably the most exciting drama to be observed and
commented on in a generation. While the main focus is understandably on the
intricacies of the divorce settlement and the exact ramifications of any future
relations between the EU and the UK, these questions are somewhat more
complex from a Scottish viewpoint. The main reason is that while the whole of
the UK voted to leave the EU by a margin of 51.9% to 48.1%, the Scottish
electorate voted to remain in the EU by a margin of 62% to 38% with not a
single council area backing ‘leave’. This led Scotland’s First Minister Nicola
Sturgeon to announce immediately after the referendum that she wished ‘to
take all possible steps and explore all options to [...] to secure our continuing
place in the EU and in the single market in particular’. The aim of this paper is
to explore how, legally speaking, such a continuing place can be secured, if it
can be at all.
Brexit, Scotland, attitudes towards EUEuropean Union Studies Association, 15th Biennial Conference, May
2017, Miami, FL, USA
Brexit and the Role of the Press and Online Media in Re-Narrating
Europe’s Discourse Before and After the Referendum
Marzia
MACCAFERRI, Goldsmiths College, University of London, no email given
Present-day debate seems less intellectually-driven and academic in
his language, and more in touch with the public opinion with evidence of the
penetration of populist attitude into the traditional political space.   
Starting from here, this paper will question the role of traditional and online
media in narrating and re-narrating the Brexit discourse and the European

question, both before and after the referendum. Sources will be traditional
British quality press, newspaper and magazines, and online media.
Drawing from Historical Discourse Analysis and Critical studies and built upon
a historical approach, this paper will examine how the current re-narration of
the European question is reproducing and reinterpreting historical arguments
vis-à- vis old clichés. Does Brexit debate shape a new form of British
Euroscepticism based on a new sense of economic confidence?  Does the
new discursive construction of Europe consist in a confrontation between this
new sense of confidence in the nation’s potentialities, and the pursue of a new
international role for Britain as a champion of freedom and as an example of
democracy? How important is the discourse of historical categories as British
‘splendid isolation’ or ‘special relationship’, and ‘British cultural peculiarity’ or
‘political traditions? Does the discursive construction of Brexit parallel the
widely held view of populism as a consequence of economic insecurity? Or,
alternatively, can Brexit populist discourse be explained as a retro reaction by
a once-predominant traditional political culture to progressive value changes?
Does Brexit represent a new ‘cultural cleavage’ dividing Populists from
Cosmopolitans?
Brexit, referendums, media, Euroscepticism, European
integration, discourse analysis, attitudes towards EU
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
The Brexit Paradox: How Leaving the EU Just May Mobilize Pro-
European Support in Britain
Kristine MITCHELL, Dickinson College,
mitchellk@dickinson.edu
Italy has Alcide De Gasperi and Altiero Spinelli; France, Jean Monnet
and Jacques Delors; Belgium Paul-Henri Spaak and Guy Verhofstadt. But
prominent, ardent pro-Europeanists, willing to make the pro-integration—even
the federal—case for Europe have been hard to find in British national debate.
Ironically, the shock referendum result has inspired Britain’s “closet
Europeanists” to declare themselves. In petitions, marches, and other
demonstrations, significant numbers of British citizens have joined forces to
resist “Brexit”. The paradox of Brexit just may be that, by emboldening a long-
subdued pro-European constituency, preparing Britain to leave the EU may
just give rise to its first prominent Euro-federalists: figures prepared to argue
persuasively and passionately for a British future in an integrating Europe.
Could a “British Delors” or an “English Spinelli” yet convince Britons that their
future lies with the EU?
Brexit, Euroscepticism, European integration, attitudes
towards EU
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Northern Ireland and Brexit: An Opportunity to Consolidate the Peace
Process?
Mary MURPHY, University College Cork, maryc.murphy@ucc.ieIn contrast to other parts of the UK, Northern Ireland voted in June
2016 to remain in the EU. This result conflicts with the overall UK vote to
leave the EU. The discrepancy has led to calls (mainly by nationalists) for
Northern Ireland's democratic preference to be respected. There is some
justification for such appeals. Being the only territory of the EU (bar Gibraltar)
which shares a land border with the EU, Northern Ireland will likely face the
worst consequences of Brexit, whatever form it takes. The economic and
political ramifications are likely to be negative and possibly severe. The Prime
Minister has - unsurprisingly - ruled out any asymmetrical approach to the UK
exit process, but she has committed to giving consideration to the specific
needs and interests of particular parts of the UK. Northern Ireland, however, is
not a priority for a UK government. There is therefore, a need for the devolved
Northern Ireland authorities to press the region's case at multiple levels both
within the UK and beyond. This is a strategically important means of getting
the best deal for Northern Ireland during the exit process. Pursuing such a
strategy, however, is not straightforward for a post-conflict society and a
power-sharing political system. Nationalists were far more likely to vote
remain while approximately one third of unionists also supported this position.
More significantly, however, the two parties to the Northern Ireland Executive
expressed contrasting positions on the EU referendum.. Designing a Northern
Ireland strategy which satisfies both parties' political sensitivities demands
political maturity. It requires the Northern Ireland authorities to confront
challenging issues related to sovereignty and the UK's constitutional future.
This political challenge represents a serious test for Northern Ireland's power-
sharing arrangement. The ability of the Northern Ireland Executive to meet
this challenge represents a potentially defining moment in the maturation of
Northern Ireland politics and society. Creative and constructive ambiguity
played a role in facilitating agreement on the 1998 Belfast Agreement. It is
needed now more than ever.
Brexit, Northern Ireland, referendumsUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Reconciling ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’: Northern Ireland and the EU
Referendum
Mary MURPHY, University College Cork,
maryc.murphy@ucc.ie
The UK referendum decision to leave the European Union (EU) in June
2016 exposes a marked political, ideological, socio-economic, demographic
and geographic divisions across the UK., Scotland, Northern Ireland and
London voted to Remain. Interestingly however, the unionist and nationalist
communities in Northern Ireland did not vote homogenously (as has
traditionally been the case) in this referendum. Although nationalists were
more likely to vote Remain, approximately one third of unionists also did.
Given Northern Ireland’s history of conflict, this vote  demonstrates some unity
of preference across the political divide. The legitimacy of Northern Ireland’s
vote however, is challenged by the fact that it conflicts with the overall UK
wide vote. This begs questions about how to accommodate legitimate
regional democratic preferences with the broader contrasting national context,
and also during negotiations between the UK and the EU. For all the recent

political progress in Northern Ireland, the region still remains politically
vulnerable. That vulnerability may be challenged if the EU referendum result
is not handled sensitively and creatively. This paper examines how political
leaders and policy actors in various settings (i.e. Northern Ireland, UK,
Republic of Ireland and the EU) might achieve accountability to the Northern
Ireland majority while respecting the national legitimacy of the overall vote.
The use of creative and constructive ambiguity, and agreement on ‘special’
arrangements for Northern Ireland vis-à- vis the Republic of Ireland post-Brexit
may be the most effective means of securing stability and responding to the
Northern Ireland majority.
Brexit, Northern IrelandCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Culture and Dis-Integration: Religion and the Brexit VoteBrent F.
NELSEN, Furman University, brent.nelsen@furman.edu, James L. GUTH,
Furman University
Scholars have known for some time that religion, more precisely
“confessional culture,” exerts a deep and independent effect on attitudes
toward the European Union and the formation of a European identity. In this
paper we use several recent surveys of British respondents to demonstrate
the impact of religion on the June 2016 vote to leave the EU. One of the data
sets used in the study features an unusually detailed religious identity
question that allows us to analyze the impact of Protestant denomination on
the Brexit vote. The findings of the paper are consistent with the results of
past studies. Protestants remain less enthusiastic about European integration
than other religious traditions, with sectarian Protestants most resistant to the
EU. Religious divisions, however, remains complicated and must be
interpreted carefully.  The primary implication for the future of European
integration, however, is clear: the EU member states most likely to withdraw
from the EU or strongly resist further integrative efforts will be member states
shaped by Protestant confessional culture.
Brexit, religion, Protestantism, EU integrationCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Europe’s Britain: Brexit Through the Eyes of the Rest of EuropeTim
OLIVER, LSE IDEAS, t.l.oliver@lse.ac.uk
Britain’s relations with the EU and Europe more broadly have often
been written about from the perspective of the UK. Current debates about the
UK’s new relationship with the EU – a Norway, Switzerland or free trade
model etc – all focus on what is best for the UK. What does the rest of Europe
think about Britain and its place in Europe? How has the British vote to leave
the EU changed European integration? Has it made it more likely that the EU
will disintegrate or integrate? Or will the EU muddle through Brexit as it has so
many other challenges, coping with it but not solving the problems it

presents? This paper builds on two ongoing projects: a book project on
European views of Britain's place in European politics and a series of reports
compiled through a network across the EU in which contributors outline
national views of ongoing UK-EU relations, with a particular focus on the
recent renegotiation, referendum and now Brexit. The paper will look at views
of the UK in terms of national debates and pan-European debates, and look at
views from other European states such as Russia and Turkey. The paper will
examine how important Britain has been for the rest of Europe in pushing
forward or limiting European integration and shaping European politics more
broadly.
Brexit, European integration, Norway, Switzerland,
attitudes towards UK
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Aspects of Citizenship and the Meaning of Citizenship: The
Complexities of Polish Migrants’ Citizenships in Scotland in the Context
of Brexit
Emilia PIETKA-NYKAZA, University of the West of Scotland,
emilia.pietka-nykaza@uws.ac.uk, Derek MCGHEE, University of
Southampton
This paper explores debates concerning the migration-citizenship nexus
by analysing the complex relations between Polish migrants’ attributes of
citizenship (status, political participation and sense of belonging) in response
to the UK’s EU Referendum held on 23 June 2016. It draws on the previous
research exploring Polish migrants’ experiences of citizenship rights during
the Scottish independence referendum in September 2014 (Pietka-Nykaza
and McGhee, 2015) and the UK General Election in 2015 (McGhee and
Pietka-Nykaza, 2016) and includes 12 interviews with Polish migrant residents
in Scotland prior and just after to the UK’s EU Referendum in June 2016.
Through exploring our participants’ initial responses to, at that time, a
potential Brexit, this article discusses the relationships between the different
aspects of citizenship: including (1) their legal statuses (e.g., as EU
citizenship, permanent residents, British and/or Polish citizenship); (2) their
opportunities for political participation; and, (3) their sense of belonging. By so
doing this paper outlines and explores the emergence of divergences as well
as the inter-relationships between these aspects of citizenship and concludes
with the discussion on the meaning of the concept of ‘citizenship’ in the
context of political change and social uncertainty.
Brexit, immigration, voting behaviour, citizenship, Poland,
Scotland, elections
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
A Qualitative Inquiry into How Europe is Narrated in the Context of the
‘Brexit’
Loredana RADU, College of Communication and Public Relations,
loredana.radu@comunicare.ro, Flavia DURACH, College of Communication
and Public Relations
In a context marked by numerous overlapping European crises,
europeanization processes might be subject to an extreme pressure exerted
by national proxies, which might denounce EU's lack of vision. Subscribing to
a constructivistic approach of European integration, where discourse is a
means by which europeanization is designed and built, we focus on the key
narratives and frames exposed by the online media when discussing about
the "Brexit". The aim of our paper is to explore the complex interactions
between frames and narratives, which fortify the architectural structure of the
mediatized discourse on the European Union. Our researchs builds on H.-J.
Trenz's narratives of Europeanization - as variants of affirmation or disruption,
and the extraordinary and the ordinary, respectively (2014), but, also, on
research dedicated to news framing as a means to convey a certain type of
meaning to the mediatized discourse. By turning to Romanian and "Pan-
European" online media outlets, we explore the two-way relationship by
hypothesizing that frames and narratives of Europeanization overlap in an
orderly manner, creating meaningful patterns and associations. We expect to
find proof of the sudden transition from positive accounts of Europeanization
to the activation of disruptive discourses (de-sacralization and crisis), with a
long term negative impact over the European project at such.
Brexit, Europeanisation, mediaUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Brexit and the Problem of European DisintegrationBen
ROSAMOND, University of Copenhagen, bf@ifs.ku.dk
This paper uses Brexit as a platform for thinking through some key
issues associated with what might be called ‘European disintegration’. The
result of the referendum in the UK held on 23 June 2016 certainly poses many
more questions than it answers, but at the very least it raises the very real
prospect of a member state leaving the European Union. What that might
mean for both the UK and the EU has very quickly become one of the defining
questions of contemporary European politics. At the same time, scholars
working on the EU are arguably very poorly prepared to grasp analytically the
mechanics of disintegration that Brexit has unleashed (or of which it is a
symptom). This paper revisits some key currents in EU Studies to show that
the absence of a worked through concept of disintegration is not necessarily a
failing of extant theory as a few scholars have suggested, but rather reflective
of a general tendency to divorce the analysis of the EU from broader
discussions about the dynamics of capaitalist democracy in Europe. Bringing
political economy 'back in' in this way allows us to develop a more systematic
understanding the meaning of distintegration, the dynamics of distintegration
and the associations between distintegrative tendencies and the unravelling of
teh European democratic capitalist compact.
Brexit, referendums, European integrationCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Consequences of National Referendums for the EU's LegitimacyRichard
ROSE, University of Strathclyde Glasgow, richard.rose@strath.ac.uk
The European Union has relied for its legitimacy on the absolute value
of European unity and the instrumental value of dealing effectively with
interdependent problems of national security, politics and economics that no
country can solve on its own. The EU's policies for the economy and
immigration have produced a rise in votes for parties protesting against their
government's acceptance of EU policies. There is also a rising demand for
national referendums to mandate their national government to reject, in
advance or to nullify after the fact, acceptance of EU policies on such issues
as immigration. Since 2014 there have been national referendums in Greece,
the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK, Hungary and Switzerland. Each reverses
the EU definition of the competence of national governments as subsidiarity to
the claims of the EU and asserts the superior authority of a national
government when its citizens disagree with what is done in their name as
European citizens subject to EU authority. National referendums enable
people with dual citizenships to use their national citizenship to challenge EU
policies adopted against their preferences. The 2016 UK referendum resolved
this conflict by the UK acting legitimately by EU standards, invoking Article 50
to withdraw from the EU. However, most national referendums threaten
something else: a challenge to EU legitimacy by a country that proposes to
remain an EU member state. This paper will contrast older theories of how EU
institutions legitimately represent states and their citizens with new challenges
arising from the demand for and use of national referendums; explain why this
demand is rising as an alternative to the electoral challenge of protest parties;
and discuss the alternative strategies that the EU has adopted in response,
and their consequences.
Brexit, referendums, EU integrationUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
National Referendums Challenge the Sustainability of the EURichard
ROSE, University of Strathclyde Glasgow, richard.rose@strath.ac.uk
The European Union has relied for its legitimacy on institutions of
representative democracy, in which a Council of nationally elected
governments and nationally elected members of the European Parliament
take decisions binding on EU citizens. However, at the national level there is a
rise in votes for parties protesting against their government’s acceptance of
EU policies. There is also a rising demand for national referendums to
mandate their national government to reject, in advance or nullify after the fact
acceptance of EU policies on such issues as immigration. Since 2014 there
have been national referendums in Greece, the Netherlands, the UK, Hungary
and Switzerland. Each claims to invoke the accountability of national
governments to national electorates as superior to the additiional
accountability of their government to multi-national EU institutions authorized
by EU treaties. The 2016 UK referendum resolved this conflict by a majority
voting to leave the EU. Much more widespread is the threat to EU authority
posed by European Council members mandated by national referendums to

reject EU policies. The paper will contrast older theories of how EU institutions
represent their citizens with the new challenge to the sustainability of the EU
due to the spread of the demand for and use of national referendums. It will
draw on discussion in a Workshop with academics and policymakers that I am
organising in January, 2017 at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European
University Institute.
referendums, Brexit, attitudes towards EU, EU integration,
Greece, Netherlands, Hungary, Switzerland
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Brexit and the Future of Europe: Towards a Theory of European
Disintegration
Antonio SERGIO, Aston University, ribeiras@aston.ac.ukThe European Union is ‘in a state of disequilibrium’ (Bickerton et al
2015), ‘failing forward’ (Jones et al 2016), or even more straightforwardly –
the EU is at risk of disintegration. Indeed, the British vote to leave the
European Union in last June’s EU referendum has put a question mark on the
future of European integration, not least because for the first time in its history
a member state is exiting the EU. Yet, academic research specifically
addressing European disintegration is at its early stages. By exploring
whether theories of European Integration can shed some light in explaining
and conceptualizing European Disintegration, this paper will take stock of the
emerging literature on European (Dis)integration theorising and will apply it to
the outcome of British EU referendum. In particular, the contribution will
explore the Brexit vote by critically engaging with Neo-functionalism’s concept
of “countervailing forces” and the recent “spillback” hypothesis put forward by
Schmitter and Lefkofrid (2016) with the six hypothesis of the New
Intergovernmentalism (Bickerton et al 2015), which this paper claims grasps
better the reasons why Britain voted to leave the EU. Although the paper
claims that the New Intergovernmentalism is at the forefront of
conceptualizing the emerging field of European (dis)integration studies, it also
claims that this is only the case due to the underdeveloped state in
differentiated (dis)integration theorising (Schimmelfennig et al 2015; Leruth
and Lord 2015; Fossum 2015).
Brexit, European Union, integration, disintegration, neo-
functionalism, new intergovernmentalism
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Brexit and the Safeguarding of EU Free Movement and CitizenshipNora
SIKLODI, University of Portsmouth, Nora.Siklodi@port.ac.uk
This Paper illustrates how citizen groups safeguard free movement and
European Union (EU) citizenship - that is to work, study and live in an EU
member state other than the country of origin – in the context of Brexit
negotiations. More specifically, the paper probes the extent to which one
specific citizen group, New Europeans, can safeguard free movement and EU

citizenship against what is set to be turbulent Brexit negotiations. The paper
builds on original, semi-structured interview evidence with native UK citizens
and EU residents who work as activists for New Europeans and their partner
citizen groups; non-participant observation from meetings and public
workshops run by New Europeans; and discourse analysis of publications by
New Europeans. It is anticipated that by seeking to safeguard free movement
and EU citizenship, New Europeans and their members realize is the type of
‘active’ EU citizenship the Commission has, time again, called for. Yet, the
context in which such ‘active’ EU citizenship is (finally) being realized is far
from ideal – and arguably represents the first exemplar of EU disintegration. It
thus puts into question the very ideals set out by the Commission as well as
the actually role citizen groups and, by the same token, public interests
groups can have in realizing these ideals. These questions then have
important consequences for the Commission’s approach to free movement,
EU citizenship and citizen/ public interests groups beyond Brexit and, by
extension, for an EU political union that may not be “on the horizon”.
Brexit, European Union, citizenship, free movementEuropean Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Making Sense of Brexit: The Implications for Domestic Social PolicyKathryn SIMPSON, Manchester Metropolitan University,
k.simpson@mmu.ac.uk
For the first time in the history of the European Union (EU) a member
state has voted to leave the Union. The UK has often been coined 'an
awkward partner' a catch-all term to encompass the UK's troubled relationship
with the European integration process and the recent vote to leave the EU
reiterates the UK's ambivalence towards its place in the wider European
family. While a full analysis of electoral data from the EU referendum on 23rd
June ensues, what is immediately evident is that the UK electorate is
inherently fragmented and that leave voters in particular voted for a range of
issues that went beyond EU issues per se. Throughout the referendum
debate these issues encompassed a range of domestic social policies such
as immigration, the economy and health. However, in light of Brexit there are
many social policy areas which will be directly impacted yet did not feature
predominantly in the referendum debate. This article examines the impact of
Brexit across three key domestic policy areas; immigration and free
movement, the devolved legislatures and the economy using data from the
British Election Study (BES) post-EU referendum survey.
Brexit, EU integration, social policy, British Election StudyUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Politicizing Perceptions: UK Citizens' Perceptions of Income and
Support for UK and European Union Governance
Kathryn SIMPSON,
Manchester Metropolitan University, k.simpson@mmu.ac.uk
Stunningly in the UK, there has been a vote to leave the European
Union (23 June 2016). This marks a culmination of challenges to the UK
government and its position on both the market and the EU. The rise of both
the BNP and UKIP as anti-EU parties (not to exclude some of the
Conservatives' own membership); the recently troubled leadership of self-
identified democratic socialist, Jeremy Corbyn, as Leader of the Labour Party;
and the Brexit vote have given rise to deep concerns that UK politics has
veered from decades-old ' left-right politics.' The challenges appear to come
from a number of sources but underpinning them are citizens' perceptions of
the UK and its economic and political performance - traditional cornerstones
of effective, representational, and legitimate government. Therefore, this
paper investigates the politicization of UK citizens' perceptions of national
inequality and the effect this has on individuals' support for both the UK and
EU governments using the British Election Study (BES). I argue that
individuals' perceptions of national economic performance can be partially
understood as a function of politicization. That is, in addition to individual
attributes, individuals' perceptions of national economic performance are
potentially shaped by parties, politicians, and the mass media which provide
citizens with both relevant information - as well as ideological frames. It
follows that the capacity of media or elite/party to bias individuals' perceptions
of national performance would significantly reshape how we think about the
role of these political intermediaries in shaping public perceptions of national
performance as well as determining EU support.
Brexit, attitudes towards EU, political parties, British
Election Study, voting
UACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
EU Citizens in the UK and Britons Abroad: Defensive Naturalizations
and Institutional Barriers
Djordje SREDANOVIC, Université Libre de
Bruxelles, sredanovic.djordje@gmail.com
Following the Brexit Referendum, EU citizens in the UK and Britons in
the Continent risk a drastic loss of rights and security, and defensive
naturalisation – obtaining respectively UK nationality or the nationality of an
EU member state – is becoming an increasingly diffused strategy.
For this paper I propose to show how the institutional and street-level
bureaucracy context of naturalisation processes can pose barriers to this
strategy, introducing further uncertainties while the exact terms of Brexit are
negotiated. The data here used derive from a qualitative research on the
implementation of nationality legislation in Belgium and the UK, for which I
have interviewed different kinds of institutions (Nationality Checking Services
and the Nationality team of UK Visas and Integration in the UK, municipal
registers and magistrates deciding on nationality application in Belgium).
EU citizens in the UK, exactly because they have benefited from easier entry
and permanence conditions, dealt until recently with a nationality procedure
that was more cumbersome that those required from the non-EU citizens.
This was one of the reasons for the introduction of the permanent residence
requirement for naturalisation for EU citizens, a decision that in turn left them
further vulnerable to potential denials. In Belgium, an extreme situation has

arisen for the British personnel of the EU. Having been in Belgium on safe
diplomatic documents, they are now discovering that periods on such
documents are not counted towards the residence requirement for Belgian
nationality, and that they might never be able to obtain nationality.
Brexit, immigration, nationality, Belgium, citizenshipEuropean Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
A 'Tipping Point' Already Reached? Tabloid Portrayals and Other
Influences on the Brexit Vote
Nicholas STARTIN, University of Bath,
n.j.startin@bath.ac.uk
The result of the June 2016 UK referendum on EU membership sent
shockwaves through the UK, European and global political establishments.
This paper argues that the outcome of the plebiscite should not be
viewed through this lens given the historical context of the UK's at best
ambivalent or at worst hostile relationship with the EU.The paper illustrates
this by analysing a number of significant historic and contemporary demand-
side and institutional variables that played into Vote Leave's favour prior to the
campaign. It then discusses the supply-side variables that influenced the
result of the campaign. The paper focuses on the role of the media and in
particular the UK's uniquely hostile Eurosceptic press as a major influence on
the outcome.By drawing on a content analysis of the front pages of the UK's
main tabloid newspapers, it demonstrates, firstly, the severity of the lopsided
pro-Brexit discourse evident prior to and during the campaign before linking
the discussion to the extent to which this 'bombardment' approach influenced
the electorate. It concludes that, given the high level of 'knowledge deficit' on
the European question in the UK, the tabloid's bombardment approach had a
significant bearing on tipping the vote towards Brexit.
Brexit, attitudes towards EU, attitudes towards UK,
Euroscepticism, media
UACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Brexit or Block It? Party and Demographic EU Divisions in Northern
Ireland
Jonathan TONGE, University of Liverpool, J.Tonge@liverpool.ac.uk,
Maire BRANIFF, Ulster University, Thomas HENNESSEY, Canterbury Christ
Church University, Jim MCAULEY, University of Huddersfield, Sophie
WHITING, University of Bath
Given its status as the only region containing a land frontier with a
European Union from which the UK is departing, Northern Ireland is
potentially greatly affected by withdrawal. Notwithstanding continuing
intergovernmental bilateral cooperation, there are likely impacts upon the
1998 Good Friday Agreement; the status of the border and prospects for
cross-border trade. Nationalist political leaders have pledged to challenge
Brexit insofar as this may be possible. Northern Ireland did not offer consent
for EU withdrawal, as the region voted by 56 to 44 per cent to
remain. Drawing upon extensive recent election survey evidence, this paper

examines the breadth and depth of Europhile and Eurosceptic sentiment in
Northern Ireland. It assesses the importance of party support as a variable in
influencing Remain or Leave attitudes relative to demographic and social
class factors; explores the salience of the unionist versus nationalist divide in
shaping pro- and anti-EU sentiment and analyses the arguments offered by
the Remain and Leave sides during and since the referendum campaign.
What motivations underpin these arguments and how have electors
responded?
Brexit, Ireland, Northern Ireland, euroscepticismAmerican Political Science Association, 113th Annual Meeting &
Exhibition, 31 August–3 September 2017, San Francisco
Brexit’s Contested European PastsRieke TRIMÇEV, Universität
Greifswald, rieke.trimcev@uni-greifswald.de, Félix KRAWATZEK, Nuffield
College, University of Oxford
In the wake of the Brexit vote, the Independent warned about the short
institutional memory which contributed to forgetting the EU’s “staggering
achievements”. The referendum on Britain’s future relationship with the EU
exposed domestic as well as continental audiences to a politics of
contingency: before and after the vote, ‘Brexit’ signified a future beyond
political imagination, a rupture in time. “Brexit means Brexit” is only the most
prominent attempt to cover this great unknown. References to a shared past
became an important means in negotiating the meaning of and response to
the referendum. However, Brexit is itself part of a gradual divide between
Britain and the EU and diverging narratives about the idea and memory of
Europe. This paper builds on a larger research which compares the role of
‘Europe’ in memory discourses in six different European countries between
2004 and 2016. Our corpus consists of articles from major daily newspapers
and is analysed through a combination of qualitative content analysis and
quantitative text analysis. The combination of these methods allows for an
analysis of continuous and changing discursive patterns. Studying this corpus
allows us to shed light on three questions in particular: How does the image of
Europe presented in Britain differ from that in other EU countries? Which
other memory strategies became visible in the UK? How can a comparison
with the discourses around the earlier EU referenda of 2005 in France and the
Netherlands contribute to our understanding of Brexit?
Brexit, media, attitudes towards EU, referendumsCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
The Limited Impact of Negative Social Media Campaigning in the UK's
EU Referendum
Simon USHERWOOD, University of Surrey,
s.usherwood@surrey.ac.uk, Katharine WRIGHT, Newcastle University
The 2016 EU referendum was typical of such exercises in the
mobilisation of a very wide range of subjects and approaches to secure a
victory by both sides, often with only limited relevance to the nominal question

on the ballot paper. One aspect of this was the continued use of negative
campaigning – that is, ad hominem attacks on opponents – as a means of
discrediting the other side and to reinforce more positive associations among
one’s own supporters. This paper explores how this negative campaigning
approach fitted into the Twitter activity of the main groups in the referendum
and the degree to which the public engaged with it. The results highlight the
limited capacity for negative campaigning to work in this environment and
highlights the limitations of constructing and supporting spaces for
constructive debate on European integration.
media, social media, Brexit, referendumsUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Explaining Brexit: How Did Immigration and Multiculturalism Become
EU Issues?
A. Maurits VAN DER VEEN, College of William and Mary,
maurits@wm.edu
The outcome of the referendum on the United Kingdom’s European
Union membership in June 2016 came as a shock even to many of Brexit’s
most ardent supporters. In the aftermath of the referendum, much has been
made of campaign mis-steps by the ‘remain’ side and of lies and distortions
by the ‘leave’ side. Scholarly analyses, meanwhile, have shown that support
for Brexit varied sharply across socio-economic groups and age cohorts
(poorer, less educated, and older voters were far more likely to vote
‘leave’). Neither the campaign aspects nor the demographic factors are
particularly surprising, although their combined effect exceeded what many
people expected. More surprising was the prominence of concerns about
immigration and multi-culturalism among Brexit voters, since neither of these
are EU-specific issues, nor is exiting the EU likely to make them easier to
tackle (let alone make them disappear altogether, as some voters appear to
have expected). Indeed, these latter concerns, and the fact that they attached
to the EU in the minds of voters, arguably drove the final outcome. After all,
British Euroscepticism has been evident for decades, and the fact that anti-EU
referendum campaigns are more spirited and generally more successful at
swaying voters has been known at least since the failed referenda on the
European Constitutional Treaty in the Netherlands and France more than ten
years ago. Yet even with these known factors, scholars almost universally
expected the ‘leave’ campaign to win. The crucial question thus becomes:
How did immigration and multi-culturalism become attached to the EU in the
minds of British voters, and how did they remain so during the campaign,
even as political leaders pointed out that Brexit would do little to address
these concerns? I hypothesize that coverage of the EU in the British media is
crucial to this outcome. In order to assess this hypothesis, this paper analyzes
all references to the European Union in four leading British papers in 2005,
2010, and 2015. These years cover the period between the last major
enlargement of the European Union (in 2004) and the referendum campaign,
which did not fully get started until 2016. I include two broadsheets, the
Guardian and the Telegraph, and two tabloids, the Daily Mail and the Daily
Mirror (each with their associated Sunday papers). Of these, the Guardian
and the Mirror are more left-leaning, while the Telegraph and the Mail lean

right. With just these four papers, therefore, we can obtain a good overview of
the British press landscape. I analyze the tens of thousands of newspaper
articles in these papers that refer to the European Union using techniques
drawn from computational linguistics and machine learning. Specifically, I
identify which topics and policy areas are most associated with mentions of
the EU. I expect these will include not just actual EU-specific policies, but also
issue areas where the EU serves as a convenient scapegoat. In addition, I
measure the tone — positive or negative — of references to the EU and these
topics. I expect the tone of the references to the EU in these contexts to be
particularly negative. It is well known that the right-wing tabloid press, in
particular, in the United Kingdom is quite Eurosceptic. However, until now it
has been difficult to assess how systematic this Euroscepticism is (does it go
beyond the headlines and front-page sensationalism?), whether it is
associated strongly with particular policies or issue areas, and how widely it is
present across the media landscape. This study will be the first to analyze
these questions systematically, using innovative techniques that have only
recently begun to be used by political scientists. The results will both
illuminate the determinants of the Brexit referendum outcome and illustrate
the potential of these new techniques.
Brexit, demographic factors, Brexit voters, education,
income, voting behaviour, Brexit campaign, immigration, multi-
culturalism, European Union, euroscepticism, media coverage
American Political Science Association, 113th Annual Meeting &
Exhibition, 31 August–3 September 2017, San Francisco
West Meets East: The Case of the Big-Bang Enlargement and the Rise in
UK Euroscepticism 2004-2016
Przemyslaw BISKUP, University of Warsaw,
p.b.biskup@uw.edu.pl
The Big-Bang Enlargement of 2004-2007 has proven to be a major
source of tensions in national and EU-level politics. This paper will attempt to
examine the mode of development and identify specific sources of
transformation of the enlargement fatigue into a highly popular Eurosceptical
stance in the United Kingdom as one of the key EU members and original
advocates of the widely-open borders. Importantly, Euroscepticism in the UK
is a complex phenomenon to be explained both in party-politics and national-
identity terms. The paper will argue that while it is a principled and well-
argued stance that has been legitimising British Euroscepticsm since 1960s, it
was the Big-Bang Enlargement fatigue that finally made it politically viable.
The issue has become central since the 201) and 2015 General Election
campaigns, which have been decisive for the future of the UKIP as a
respectable party and the fate of UK's EU referendum. The issue also played
a central role in the 2016 EU referendum, and its final result in support of
Brexit. The paper shall focus on the comparative manifesto and party-platform
analysis of the leading UK parties: the Tories, Labour, UKIP and LibDems, to
be focused on issues connected to Euroscepticsm and immigration from the
"new" EU countries in years 2001-2016. It will incorporate the data collected
during the Warsaw University-based research project conducted in 2011-
2014.
Euroscepticism, Brexit, elections, national identityUACES, 47th Annual Conference, 4-6 September 2017, Krakow
Think Nationally, Vote Locally: National Issues and Voting Behaviour in
Local, Regional and European Elections in Spain
Laura CABEZA
PÉREZ, SOCLIFE - University of Cologne, cabeza@wiso.uni-koeln.de
The second-order election model is among the most influential
conceptual frameworks for analyzing sub-national and supra-national election
results. Yet, most studies focus on its aggregate predictions. According to this
model, election results at any level are a by-product of the national
government popularity because, instead of holding accountable sub-national
or supra-national representatives, citizens presumably decide whether to vote
and for whom on the grounds of the first-order national arena. Using data from

election surveys in Spain, this article develops and tests a micro-level
approach to the study of second-order effects in sub-national and supra-
national elections. It is argued that in every election at local, regional or
European level there are individuals that decide their vote – or whether to vote
or not – on the basis of national considerations and individuals that make their
decisions based on level-specific issues. Each election will show a different
distribution of citizens that vote on the basis of national versus level-specific
issues. Using a new dataset that combines data from a set of election surveys
in Spain, this article analyzes (1) which individual characteristics encourage
citizens to ‘think nationally’ in local, regional and European elections, and (2)
whether the core assumptions of the second-order election model hold at the
individual level leading to differences in terms of voting behaviour between
those citizens that ‘think nationally’ and those who do not. Doing so, this
research contributes to recent efforts that have already recognized the need
to identify the individual mechanisms behind the second-order election model.
elections, voting behaviourCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Referendums in the European Union: Defective by Birth?Francis
CHENEVAL,
University of Zürich, francis.cheneval@philos.uzh.ch, Mónica
FERRÍN,
University of Zürich and Collegio Carlo Alberto
On the basis of a combined examination of normative claims and
empirical evidence this paper discusses minimal criteria for the institutional
design of referendums on EU-internal issues. These criteria concern the
mandatory (vs. facultative), the simultaneous (vs. serial) and binding (vs.
consultative) nature of referenda. The proposed criteria are demanding, both
for the member states and the European Union, but experiences show that
the EU is in fact participating actively in EU-issues referendums and member
states as well as the EU need to surpass the current arbitrary use of
plebiscites by governments. On a broader scale the paper contributes to the
insight that it might be time to fully address the use of direct democracy at the
national and EU levels.
referendums, attitudes towards EUEuropean Union Studies Association, 15th Biennial Conference, May
2017, Miami, FL, USA
Towards a More Legitimate Form of Direct Democracy in the European
Union
Francis CHENEVAL, University of Zurich,
francis.cheneval@philos.uzh.ch
Recent plebiscites in EU member states, in particular the Brexit vote,
have given rise to the question of which forms of popular vote can be deemed
adequate instruments for decision making in a demoicracy. In a first part, this
paper elaborates the conceptual underpinnings and most basic institutional
features of demoicracy, i.e. a union of citizens and peoples. Secondly, it
explains the distinction between plebiscitary and direct democracy. After a

critique of the arbitrary governmental practice of plebiscites in EU member
states the author singles out the citizen-induced referendum right with binding
votes on secondary legislation as the most legitimacy-enhancing for the EU
for the time being. Given the structure of the EU as a demoicracy, the votes
should be aggregated in accordance with the principle of double majority of
citizens and peoples. The facultative referendum is weighed against the
possibility of a veto right of a majority of national parliaments against
secondary EU legislation. For the time being this latter option would be more
in line with the traditions of representative democracy of EU member states
but overburdens the parliaments and does not engage the citizens directly.
referendums, European Union, democracy, direct
democracy, representative democracy
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Right-Wing Populist Party Supporters: Dissatisfied But Not Direct
Democrats
David DENEMARK, University of Western Australia,
David.Denemark@uwa.edu.au, Todd DONOVAN, Western Washington
University, Duncan MCDONNELL, Griffith University
Right-wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal
democracy functions with calls for greater direct or deliberative democracy.
But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article,
survey data is used to examine, first, whether right-wing populist candidates in
Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct forms of
democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right-wing
populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are
investigated. While right-wing populist candidates are shown to be far more
likely to support direct democracy, right-wing populist supporters do not mirror
the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how
democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than
other voters – echoing what some have labelled as “stealth democracy.” Our
findings have important implications both for how we conceive of the
relationship between populism and direct
democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.
referendums, populism, direct democracy, survey data,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
When Knowledge Counts Twice: The Role of Turnout in EU
Referendums
Johan A. ELKINK, University College Dublin,
jos.elkink@ucd.ie, Thomas SATTLER, University of Geneva, Sarah
PARLANE, University College Dublin
Aggregate data on EU referendums indicate that turnout has a
significant impact on the referendum outcome. Existing studies of
referendums, however, tend to either explain turnout, or, given a vote and

ignoring non-voters, vote choice. It therefore misses an important part of
citizens’ choice, namely the impact of vote preference on turnout. This is
problematic especially when individuals’ characteristics influence both the
decision to turn out and the vote choice of those who decide to vote. For
instance, voters who are more knowledgeable about the referendum issue are
more likely to turn out as well as to vote “Yes” when they do. This means that
there is an amplified effect of knowledge on voting behaviour, first via turnout
and second via vote choice. This paper proposes a new formal model to
capture the interaction between uncertainty, turnout, and vote choice. In
particular, it develops a game-theoretical model of the impact of uncertainty
around the referendum options on the decision to participate and the support
for the referendum question – in this case further European integration. We
develop an accompanying statistical model that reflects the formal model and
jointly estimates turnout, vote choice, and their interaction. We evaluate the
performance of the model on survey data on a series of ten European
integration referendums over the past 25 years, in Denmark, Ireland, France,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Spain. We show that the estimated effect
of uncertainty – or lack of knowledge – on referendum outcomes is
significantly larger when the relevance of this variable for both turnout and
vote choice is considered simultaneously.
referendums, European Union, turnout, game theory,
integration, vote choice, Denmark, Ireland, France, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Spain, uncertainty
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
An Alternative to Representation: Preferences for Citizens As Political
Decision-Makers in Germany
Sergiu GHERGHINA, Goethe University
Frankfurt, ghergina@soz.uni-frankfurt.de, Brigitte GEISSEL, Goethe
University Frankfurt, geissel@soz.uni-frankfurt.de
In recent decades increasing attention is dedicated in the literature to
citizens’ preferences for alternative models of political decision-making. Most
of these studies either tried to describe these preferences or to link them with
political behavior. However, it only marginally referred to who these citizens
are and why they display a certain preference. To partially address this void in
the literature, our paper investigates the determinants of preferences for
citizens as decision-makers by using individual-level data from a survey
conducted in autumn 2014 on a probability representative sample in
Germany. The survey answers indicate that almost one quarter of the
respondents (approximately 700) have a clear preference towards citizens as
decision-makers while the rest either favor representative / expert democracy
or have mixed preferences. Our paper tests the extent to which interest in
politics, media consumption, civic engagement, and socio-economic status
(SES) can explain the preference for citizens as decision-makers. The results
indicate that low satisfaction with democracy, a heavy critique of the
Parliament as the main law-making body, and high interest in politics are
more likely to favor the preference for citizens as decision-makers. At the

same time, the SES factors do not play a role in this preference, i.e. rich
people, less educated and older do not prefer citizens as decision-makers.
referendums, democracy, political decision-makers,
political participation, Germany
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, 12-14 July 2017, Glasgow
Progress and Reverse in the European IntegrationAnastasia
GOLOFAST, Moscow State Institute of International Relations,
nastya1555@gmail.com
The dynamics of the European integration resemble a pendulum
swinging between progress (supranationality strengthening) and reverse
(renationalization). Such events as the creation of the Eurozone and the
establishment of the Schengen area clearly demarcate progress. The
examples of reverse are the failure of the European constitution at the
referenda in France and the Netherlands or the UK opting for Brexit. 
Both progress and reverse are normatively neutral processes, as each of
them fulfills productive functions for the European Union. Thus, progress
helps the EU to show its raison d’être both to its own member states and to
the non-EU states. Progress encourages the EU to create its own identity by
adopting common goals to the realia. In turn, reverse is in-built in the EU’s
decision-making process to save member states’ symbolic and material
resources. The European Commission as the main agent of integration tends
to make proposals that maximize authority delegation, while the European
Parliament and the Council of Ministers as agents of reverse introduce
amendments in favour of the member states. The stronger is progress, the
more visible is the reverse it provokes. If progress is incremental and reverse
is groundbreaking, important problems at the previous stages of the
integration process have not been timely solved. At first glance, it seems
evident that reverse creates obstacles on the way to advanced integration
stages. However, this impression turns out to be false, because reverse and
disintegration are not one and the same thing. Reverse only shows that the
problems of the previous integration phases have remained unresolved, and
may turn into threats in case they are ignored for the sake of forcing
enhanced authority delegation. Moving ahead despite the EU’s existing
institutional shortcomings would mean the necessity for the stronger states to
compensate for the asymmetries of the political system by solving the
problems of the weaker members. In this case, the gap between the stronger
and the weaker EU states may broaden and may create a real threat of
disintegration. Reverse is the EU's natural safety lock from this scenario.
There are three possible reactions to reverse: absorption of the EU's
opponents, elaboration of new initiatives taking into account the opponents'
positions, exit of the opponents. The first option proves the strength of the
EU’s critics, the second one helps stabilize the pace of progress, the third one
enables maximum unity. Therefore, the EU can ensure safe progress only by
reacting to reverse. Without reverse, the integration supporters have the same
chances for success as a driver of a car without brakes.
European Union, integration, disintegrationEuropean Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
EU Referendums: What Can we Learn from the Swiss CaseEva
HEIDBREDER, Free University Berlin, Otto-von- Guericke Universität
Magdeburg, eva.heidbreder@ovgu.de, Isabelle STADELMANN-STEFFEN,
University of Bern, Eva THOMANN, University of Heidelberg, Fritz SAGER,
University of Bern
The recent Brexit vote has reinforced scholarly interest in the role of
referendums on European Union (EU) matters. This research note argues that
when analysing these referendums, more systematic reference should be
made to existing research on direct democracy, especially from the Swiss and
US context. Therefore, this research note scrutinises the research questions
raised, explanatory and methodological models commonly applied in research
on EU-referendums, in order to pinpoint insights that have been missed.
Offering a comparative perspective on theoretical approaches, empirical
findings and methodological innovations in referendum research allows
identifying more accurately scope conditions under which referendums
operate in the EU. Particularly, the dynamics of referendums depend strongly
on the wider democratic institutional framework. Methodological challenges
for predicting polling outcomes, and the interplay between direct democracy
and populist appeals also need more explicit consideration in EU referendum
research.
referendums, Switzerland, Brexit, European integrationEuropean Union Studies Association, 15th Biennial Conference, May
2017, Miami, FL, USA
National Referendums in Poland, Croatia and Montenegro. A
Comparative Analysis
Maria MARCZEWSKA-RYTKO, Uniwersytet Marii
Curie-Skłodowskiej, m_marczewska@yahoo.com
The aim of the presentation is to analyze national referendum as a part
of social and political participation. There will be analyzed tree countries:
Poland, Croatia and Montenegro after the collapse of the communist system.
The presentation consists of three parts: conditions of national referendum in
these three countries, formal-legal assumptions and practice of national
referendums.
referendums, democracy, political participation, Poland,
Croatia, Montenegro, communism
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
35 Years After the ‘Grøxit’-Referendum: Why the EU Still Plays an
Important Role for Greenlandic Diplomacy
Rasmus Leander
NIELSEN, University of Greenland, raln@uni.gl
In 1982, Greenland convened a referendum that paved the way to
eventually leaving the European Communities three years later. ‘Grøxit’ - a
portmanteau of Grønland, the Danish translation of Greenland, and exit,
applied here since ‘Grexit’ is already preoccupied by Greece in EU-jargon –
gained some scholarly, comparative interest in the aftermath of the British
exit-referendum from the EU in June 2016, commonly known as ‘Brexit’.
However, while many has either stressed the minor resemblances or, more
commonly, the big differences in the two ‘exit-cases’, the analyses of the
Greenlandic case generally rest on very rudimentary archive studies, content
analyses, or revisiting the few mainly descriptive sources from the 1970-80s.
In other words, the very first ‘exit-case’ from the EU calls for elaborations.
Furthermore, process tracing the developments since shows a paradoxical
development. While events leading up the 1982-vote spurred a ‘Greenlandic
Spring’ in terms of political awakening on the world’s largest island, the EU
still plays a vital role in Greenland’s diplomatic conducts and economic affairs.
The purpose of this paper is, thus, twofold: First, to scratch beyond the
surface of the 1982-referendum and provide a more theoretically founded and
methodological vigorous analysis of the ballot. Second, to trace the
developments in Greenland-EU relations since the mid-1980’ in order to gain
a more elaborated understanding of the case 35 years after ‘Grøxit’.
referendums, European Union, Greenland, Denmark,
distintegration
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
What’s Left of ‘Split’ Popular Sovereignty after the Brexit Vote?Markus
PATBERG, Hamburg Universität, markus.patberg@wiso.uni-hamburg.de
Apparently affirming ideas of ‘every state for itself’, the Brexit vote puts
models of constituent power in the EU under pressure. In particular, the UK
referendum seems to undermine the notion of pouvoir constituant mixte,
according to which the EU derives its democratic legitimacy from the citizens
in two roles, namely as European and member state citizens. In this paper, I
defend this idea against three objections. First, I address the analytical
challenge of whether ‘split’ popular sovereignty can still be presented as a
rational reconstruction of the EU constitutional order after the decision of one
of the largest member states to withdraw from the EU. Second, I turn to the
political challenge of whether the pouvoir constituant mixte with its
supranational implications can be a promising candidate for a public narrative
that allows citizens to recognize the value of EU in a time when many people
seem to be concerned about losses of national self-determination. Third, I
deal with the theoretical challenge of whether academic attempts to identify a
founding authority of the EU represent a category mistake that may have
contributed to the flawed idea – which was popular in the referendum
campaign – that the UK could return to a (fictitious) status quo ante and re-
activate an ‘original’ democratic agent that had lost its power in the course of
European integration.
Brexit, political decision-making, immigration, voting
behaviour
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Synching Representation: The Effects of Bottom-Up Direct Democratic
Institutions on Government Responsiveness
Yvette
PETERS, Universitetet i Bergen, yvette.peters@uib.no, Alexander H.
TRECHSEL, University of Lucerne
As contemporary democracies function largely through the mechanism
of representation, many studies have examined the link between what citizens
want and what they get. Mostly focusing on the US, scholars have established
that a general responsiveness tends to exist. However, we know much less
about the conditions that aid or constraint responsiveness. We examine
representation in Europe, and argue that more direct institutions of democracy
helps to synch public policies to public preferences. This study analyzes a
time-series cross-sectional data including 26 European countries in order to
test this expectation. Conditioning the relation between social policy
preferences and social spending on bottom-up institutions of direct democracy
as well as the use of referendums, we find that citizen initiatives and the
frequency of referendums increase government responsiveness in terms of
social policies.
referendums, Europe, direct democracy, policy
responsiveness, citizen preferences, social policy, social spending,
bottom-up, citizen initiatives
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Drawing Electoral Boundaries in Independence Referendums: What
People for What State?
Alexandra REMOND, University of Edinburgh,
a.remond@ed.ac.uk
This Paper investigates the practice of drawing electoral boundaries in
independence referendums. The electoral boundaries in an independence
referendum have two very important symbolic consequences in regards to
identity. Firstly, the presence of an independence referendum is a statement
that a people exist, and that such people have a right to decide whether they
wish to create their own independent sovereign state. As such, it is both a
marker that a nation exists, and that nationhood can lead to statehood.
Secondly, how the collectivity that has a right to decide on the issue is defined
and bounded is crucial in defining the future demos and its identity. Drawing
on examples from Montenegro, New Caledonia, South Sudan and Scotland
among others, different ways of defining the group and mechanisms used to
draw its boundaries in the form of the eligible electorate are considered. From
ethnic or cultural markers to residency or citizenship, each mode adopted
presents controversies and may have lasting consequences on the future
definition of the collective “we”. The Paper uncovers how those boundaries
are negotiated and their potential consequences. For a start, drawing the
boundaries of the electorate who is to decide on statehood is often crucial to

the referendum outcome. Furthermore, who gets a say, and how the
referendum campaign will engage with them or not, has important implications
for the legitimacy of the proposed new state, and the relationship between the
former minority - now to potentially become the majority - and the new
resulting minorities.
referendums, independence, electoral boundaries,
sovereignty, Montenegro, New Caledonia, South Sudan, Scotland,
citizenship
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
Incongruence Between European, National and Regional Elections in the
European Multilevel Electoral System
Arjan SCHAKEL, Maastricht
University, a.schakel@maastrichtuniversity.nl
The number of countries holding elections for the European Parliament
has increased from 9 in 1979 to 28 in 2014. Since the 1970s, 19 European
Union member states hold or have introduced elections to a regional tier of
government. The electoral transformation has been accompanied by shifts in
authority. The stakes in supranational and subnational elections have
increased because substantial authority has shifted from the national level to
the regional and European levels. Opportunities have increased for voters to
express their opinion about policies and governments across electoral arenas.
But in how far represent supranational and subnational election outcomes a
deviation from electoral behaviour in the national political arena? In this paper
I will explore dissimilarity in the vote between European, national and regional
elections. By employing various incongruence measures I explore where,
when and how the European vote differs from the national and regional vote
in the European regions. Dissimilarity in the vote is related to various factors
which are thought to impact on congruence between electoral outcomes.
Special attention will be given to electoral timing of an election vis-à- vis other
elections, authority endowed to regional tiers of government, and territorial
cleavages. I assess the impact of these variables by exploiting a unique
dataset which contains European, national and regional election results
disaggregated at the regional level for 180 regions in eight EU member states
from 1979 until 2014.
elections, European Parliament, tiers of governmentCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Timing Practice: The Role of the Future in the Brexit Debate on
European Defence
Øyvind SVENDSEN, University of Copenhagen,
oyvind.svendsen@ifs.ku.dk
The conduct of international relations is intimately tied to the handling of
time. Still, International Relations (IR) remains inattentive to how the everyday
conduct of international politics is enabled and constrained by temporal
elements, especially the role of the future. Introducing a novel approach

binding the past, present and future together for the study social action and
practice in IR, the article argues that the visions that practitioners have about
the future in times of perceived change, is a useful analytical tool in trying to
understand political practices. Illustrated by the debate over the future of
European defence in relation to Brexit, the article develops the concept of
doxic visions – situated representations of the future that guide practice. From
such an approach, IR scholars can ask questions about how social agents
rationalise premised on the ontologically indivisible relationship between the
past and the future in the structuring of practice. This allows also for a more
pragmatic relationship with the nexus between the tacit and the explicit
elements of how social agents rationalise.
Brexit, political decision-making, immigration, voting
behaviour
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo
EU Referenda: What to Learn from the Swiss CaseEva
THOMANN, Heidelberg University, eva.thomann@ipw.uni-heidelberg.de, Eva
HEIDBREDER, University of Dusseldorf, Isabelle STADELMANN-
STEFFEN, University of Bern, Fritz SAGER, University of Bern
The recent Brexit vote has reinforced scholarly interest in the role of
European Union (EU) referenda for European integration. This research note
argues that Swiss experience with EU-related direct democratic votes
represents a critical case for the study of EU referenda in the present era. The
rich body of related research provides a useful starting point for exploring
some of the most pressing questions in research on EU referenda. Therefore,
this research note discusses three ways in which insights from Switzerland
can contribute to this research. First, it helps us understand the circumstances
under which popular votes effectively serve political and / or legitimizing
purposes. Second, we derive insights on the role of campaigning, the
multidimensionality and lacking predictability of the outcomes of popular
votes, and propose methodological improvements. Third, we discuss the
implications of popular votes for the legitimacy of EU integration as well as
their mindful implementation.
referendums, Switzerland, Brexit, European integrationCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Attitudes Towards European Integration at Times of Crisis: The Case of
Greece
Dimitris TSAROUHAS, Bilkent University, dimitris@bilkent.edu.tr,
Georgios KARYOTIS, University of Glasgow
The pace and legitimacy of the European Integration project has, to
some extent, always been held at the hands of the public, with over 45
referendums held in the past five decades in Member States. However, the
Eurozone crisis and the recent ‘Brexit’ vote in the United Kingdom have
provided new impetus for exploring how attitudes towards the EU develop.

Using Greece as a case study, this paper analyses the drivers of attitudes
towards European integration, focussing on how crisis dynamics affect
support for further unification. The paper draws on original and pertinent
survey evidence collected between 2010 and 2015 through representative
telephone surveys. The analysis synthesises insights from political behaviour,
crisis management and the Europeanisation theory to test a range of relevant
hypotheses. Findings demonstrate that public evaluations on the causes,
severity, responsibility, and responses to the Greek debt crisis are key factors
of support for the EU project, alongside trust and other political values
associated with authoritarianism, multiculturalism and globalisation. The
discussion explores these results and their theoretical and comparative
implications.
Greece, Europeanisation, referendums, debt crisis,
attitudes towards EU, EU integration
Council for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Direct Democracy, the Structure of Government and Welfare State
Expansion 1930-2000
André WALTER, University of St. Gallen,
andre.walter@unisg.ch
The existing literature on welfare state development holds a pessimistic
view on the role of direct democracy for welfare state generosity. More
specifically, the literature argues that referendums constrain the extension of
social security spending while pro-welfare initiatives are mostly rejected. In
contrast, I argue that the effect of initiatives on welfare state extension is
conditional on the political environment. More precisely, I combine insights
from the the political economy literature about the structure of the government
with comparative welfare state research. Using panel data on social
expenditure in the Swiss cantons from 1930 to 2000, I show that initiatives
constrain social spending of multiparty governments but expand social
spending of single party governments. In addition, I provide case evidence
from the Swiss cantons to explore the causal links between initiatives and
social expenditure.
referendums, welfare state, Switzerland, public spendingCouncil for European Studies, 24th International Conference of
Europeanists, July 2017, Glasgow, UK
Politicisating Europe from Bottom to Top?Claudia WIESNER, Hamburg
Universität, claudia.wiesner@staff.uni-marburg.de
This paper in its first part addresses the concept of EU politicisation as
it has been developed in the recent literature and discusses analytical
strenghts and weaknesses of the state of the art of the conceptual debate.
Afterwards, it is suggested that politicisation should be conceptualised in a
way that puts a stronger emphasis on citizen and activist action and hence on
a bottom-up direction of politicising Europe and a corresponding
conceptualisation of politicisation is presented. In the second part of the

paper, this conceptualisation is used in discussing the French EU referendum
discourse and the German ratification discourse on the EU constitutional
Treaty in a comparative perspective. Results show that especially in the
French case the outcome of both discourse and referendum can only be
suffiently understood and explained is if the bottom-up component of
politicisation is systematically taken into account and analysed.
referendums, European Union, politicisation, citizen action,
activism, France, French referendum, Germany, EU Constitution,
bottom-up
European Consortium for Political Research, General Conference, 6–9
September 2017, Oslo